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RECONCEPTUALIZING THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: 
SLAVES, PRISONERS, AND “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL” 
PUNISHMENT* 
ALEXANDER A. REINERT** 
The meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause has long been hotly contested. For scholars 
and jurists who look to original meaning or intent, there is little 
direct contemporaneous evidence on which to rest any 
conclusion. For those who adopt a dynamic interpretive 
framework, the Supreme Court’s “evolving standards of 
decency” paradigm has surface appeal, but deep conflicts have 
arisen in application. This Article offers a contextual account of 
the Eighth Amendment’s meaning that addresses both of these 
interpretive frames by situating the Amendment in eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century legal standards governing relationships of 
subordination. 
In particular, I argue that the phrase “cruel and unusual 
punishment[]” was intertwined with pre- and post-Revolutionary 
notions of the permissible limits on the treatment of slaves. The 
same standard that the Framers adopted for the treatment of 
prisoners in 1787 was contemporaneously emerging as the 
standard for holding slaveholders and others criminally and 
civilly liable for harsh treatment of slaves. Indeed, by the middle 
of the nineteenth century, constitutional law, positive law, and 
common law converged to regulate the treatment of prisoners 
and slaves under the same “cruel and unusual” rubric. Thus, 
when the Supreme Court of Virginia referred to prisoners in 1871 
as “slaves of the State[,]” the description had more than 
rhetorical force. 
Going beyond the superficial similarity in legal standards, 
examining how the “cruel and unusual” standard was explicated 
in the context of slavery offers important insights to current 
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debates within the Eighth Amendment. First, the contention by 
some originalists that the Punishments Clause does not 
encompass a proportionality principle is in tension with how 
courts interpreted the same language in the context of slavery. 
Indeed, relationships of subordination had long been formally 
governed by a principle of proportional and moderate 
“correction,” even though slavery in practice was characterized 
by extreme abuse. Second, to the extent that dynamic 
constitutional interpretation supports limiting criminal 
punishment according to “evolving standards of decency,” the 
comparative law frame used here raises questions as to how far 
our standards have evolved. This, in turn, should cause 
commentators and jurists to reconsider whether the twenty-first-
century lines we have drawn to regulate the constitutional bounds 
of punishment are adequate to advance the principle of basic 
human dignity that is thought to be at the heart of the Eighth 
Amendment. 
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Every year, prisoners’ rights cases constitute a substantial 
percentage of new filings brought in federal court.1 Most of these 
 
 1. Even after passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-
134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was intended to stem the tide of prisoners’ rights litigation, 
caseloads remain high. In 2013, for instance, approximately 25,000 prisoners filed cases in 
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cases will implicate the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, which in its Punishments Clause prohibits the 
imposition of “cruel and unusual punishment[].”2 The Eighth 
Amendment has been interpreted to regulate both the formal 
sentences that may be imposed for particular offenses as well as the 
conditions under which prisoners must serve those sentences.3 Thus, 
whether a prisoner is challenging the length of a particular sentence,4 
the appropriateness of execution for particular crimes or categories of 
offenders,5 an officer’s use of force,6 a prison’s failure to provide 
medical care,7 the failure to protect prisoners from assault,8 or 
 
federal court relating to prison conditions or civil rights, about ten percent of the total 
caseload in the federal courts. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT 
COURTS—CIVIL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.C-2, at 3  
(Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary
/december-2013.aspx [http://perma.cc/84B7-7TX3]. These figures have remained relatively 
unchanged over the past five years. E.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.C-2, at 
2 (Dec. 31, 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/StatisticalTablesForTheFederalJudiciary
/December2008.aspx	[http://perma.cc/3WST-23G4] (reporting approximately 25,000 prisoner 
civil rights filings out of 265,000 total federal court filings in 2008). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This is not to say that the Eighth Amendment is the 
only relevant constitutional provision in prisoners’ rights litigation. The First, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments each have limited application to prisoners, but the 
Eighth Amendment has been applied to directly govern a broad range of prison 
conditions. See infra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 3. The Supreme Court first struck down a sentence for violating the Eighth 
Amendment in 1910. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). In 1962, the Court 
found that the Eighth Amendment was incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). And in 1976, the Court 
ushered in modern prison condition jurisprudence by holding that the Eighth Amendment 
protected prisoners from harm caused by the “deliberate indifference” of prison officials. 
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 4. E.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 283 (1983). 
 5. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (finding capital punishment 
unconstitutional where the defendant was convicted of a crime that did not involve death); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (holding that it was unconstitutional to 
execute a defendant who committed a crime as a juvenile); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304, 321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of a 
mentally retarded prisoner). 
 6. E.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992). 
 7. E.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 8. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 848–49 (1994) (finding that the Eighth 
Amendment can apply where prison officials fail to protect a prisoner from other 
prisoners); see also Arnold v. Cty. of Nassau, 252 F.3d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying 
Farmer in the context of corrections officers’ deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of 
inmate violence); Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (indicating that an assault 
invited by a staff member’s statements to other inmates is actionable); Fischl v. Armitage, 
128 F.3d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that an assault made possible by an officer’s opening 
of a cell is actionable). 
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harmful conditions of confinement in general,9 the Eighth 
Amendment will guide resolution of the controversy. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, its wide application, the meaning 
and mission of the Eighth Amendment is highly contested. A vocal 
minority of the Supreme Court maintains that modern application of 
the Punishments Clause has gone off the rails in two notable ways—
first, by permitting challenges to sentences on the basis of their 
proportionality,10 and second, by authorizing courts to make 
subjective assessments as to when conditions of confinement or 
specific punishments contravene “evolving standards of decency.”11 
The critics’ objections are both methodological (founded in an 
originalist account of the Eighth Amendment’s meaning) and 
 
 9. E.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (discussing the Eighth 
Amendment’s limitations on permissible conditions of confinement); see also Helling v. 
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (permitting a lawsuit based on exposure to second-hand 
tobacco smoke); LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that a claim 
could be made for exposure to asbestos). 
 10. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the Eighth Amendment regulates only the method, and not the amount, of 
punishment); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (arguing, based 
on original meaning, that there is no “proportionality guarantee” provided by the Eighth 
Amendment); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 313 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
prevailing view up to now has been that the Eighth Amendment reaches only the mode of 
punishment and not the length of a sentence of imprisonment.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.) (“Given the unique nature of the punishments 
considered in Weems and in the death penalty cases, one could argue without fear of 
contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and 
classifiable as felonies, that is, as punishable by significant terms of imprisonment in a state 
penitentiary, the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative 
prerogative.”). 
 11. The objection has been lodged both as to the reliance on the Eighth Amendment 
to regulate conditions of confinement, see, e.g., Hudson, 503 U.S. at 28 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“The Eighth Amendment is not, and should not be turned into, a National 
Code of Prison Regulation.”), as well as to the Court’s reliance on subjective assessments 
to determine when a particular punishment is in conflict with “evolving standards of 
decency,” see, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 459 (2008) (statement of Scalia, J., 
and Roberts, C.J., respecting denial of rehearing); see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 
2455, 2490 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Unless our cases change course, we will continue 
to march toward some vision of evolutionary culmination that the Court has not yet 
disclosed. The Constitution does not authorize us to take the country on this journey.”); 
Graham, 560 U.S. at 121 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I simply cannot accept that these 
subjective judgments of proportionality are ones the Eighth Amendment authorizes us to 
make.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court 
thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation’s moral standards—and in the course of 
discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of 
foreign courts and legislatures.”); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 859 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Conditions of confinement are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, 
unless imposed as part of a sentence.”); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (summarizing the Court’s 
prior holdings to disapprove of reliance on “subjective views of judges”). 
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institutional (expressing concern about the legitimacy of judicial 
rather than legislative or executive assessments of the 
appropriateness of particular punishments).12 Proponents of the 
Court’s current approach, by contrast, generally adopt a dynamic 
interpretive framework to decide constitutional questions and are 
more comfortable using judicial oversight to displace penal policy and 
practice.13 
The controversy over the Eighth Amendment’s meaning has 
naturally focused courts and commentators alike on the intentions of 
the clause’s drafters, at least as a starting, if not an ending, point of 
the analysis.14 There is widespread agreement that there is very little 
direct evidence of what the First Congress intended to convey by 
inserting the provision into the Bill of Rights.15 The Amendment was 
 
 12. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth 
Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742–43 (2008) 
(summarizing the debate). 
 13. See Douglas A. Berman, Graham and Miller and the Eighth Amendment’s 
Uncertain Future, 27 CRIM. JUST. 19, 24 (2013) (“Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has 
robustly and repeatedly embraced what might be called ‘living Constitution rhetoric’ in all 
its major Eighth Amendment rulings for more than a century.”); Alexander A. Reinert, 
Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement Litigation Benefit from 
Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 62–63, 63 n.36 (2009) (arguing that 
the Court’s embrace of a dynamic interpretation of the Eighth Amendment began with 
Weems v. United States); cf. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
a sentence was disproportionate based on the “living Constitution”); Sharon Dolovich, 
Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 891 n.39 
(2009) (arguing for a broader understanding of “cruelty” based on “living 
constitutionalism”). 
 14. Compare Graham, 560 U.S. at 58–59 (finding a proportionality principle in the 
Eighth Amendment), and Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
(using “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” to 
measure the reach of the Punishments Clause), with Graham, 560 U.S. at 99 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that “cruel and unusual” regulates only the method, and not the 
amount, of punishment), and Solem, 463 U.S. at 313 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
prevailing view up to now has been that the Eighth Amendment reaches only the mode of 
punishment and not the length of a sentence of imprisonment.”). See also Anthony F. 
Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 844–60 (1969) (arguing that the drafters of the English Bill of Rights 
intended to prohibit both excessive and barbarous punishments). 
 15. John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause in the 21st Century, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 297, 299–300 (2013) (noting 
sparse legislative history and contemporaneous debate); Laurence Claus, Methodology, 
Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral Question Does the Eighth Amendment Pose?, 31 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 35–36 (2008) (describing deliberations as “rather 
perfunctory”); Tessa M. Gorman, Comment, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth 
Amendment and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 
CALIF. L. REV. 441, 461 (1997) (“In sum, the meaning of the Declaration of Rights’ cruel 
and unusual punishment clause is not entirely clear	.	.	.	.”); Granucci, supra note 14, at 840–
41 (stating that the Eighth Amendment was considered “constitutional ‘boilerplate’	”). 
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taken from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which itself adopted 
wholesale a similar provision from the English Bill of Rights.16 But 
there was little contemporaneous debate or commentary when the 
Amendment was introduced and ratified. 
This does not mean that scholars have completely foregone 
investigating the possible meanings that drafters could have had in 
mind when the Eighth Amendment was adopted. Legal historians 
have suggested that founding era concerns about state-sanctioned 
cruelty emanated from several sources: prior experience with the 
British monarchy; Enlightenment critiques of torture and other 
punishments employed by England and, to some degree, its colonies; 
and intellectual commentary that was influential during the founding 
era.17 Blackstone, who used the term “cruel and unusual” to illustrate 
what constituted “express malice” for the purpose of murder, exerted 
considerable influence on the founding generation,18 and Cesare 
Beccaria’s treatise on crime and punishment was popular on both 
sides of the Atlantic.19 
These historical accounts have offered useful insights into the 
potential meaning the founders ascribed to the Eighth Amendment.20 
But they have neglected a rich source of information—the 
jurisprudence of slavery, which, on its face, was guided by the same 
 
John Stinneford, however, finds more clarity by examining debates regarding other 
provisions of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, ultimately concluding that “the only 
plausible meaning” of the word “unusual” was that it was intended to limit innovation in 
punishment. Stinneford, supra note 12, at 1809–10. 
 16. Bessler, supra note 15, at 312–13; Granucci, supra note 14, at 848. 
 17. See Bessler, supra note 15, at 315–17 (describing the use of concepts in case law, 
Blackstone, contemporaneous documents, and the writings of “influential thinkers”); 
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Talking About Cruelty: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile 
Offenders After Miller v. Alabama, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 885, 896–99 (2013) (looking to 
writings of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Cesare Beccaria, and Montesquieu); 
Stinneford, supra note 12, at 1745–46 (arguing that common understanding of the word 
“unusual” equated the term with “government practices that are contrary to ‘long usage’ 
or ‘immemorial usage.’	”); see also Deborah A. Schwartz & Jay Wishingrad, The Eighth 
Amendment, Beccaria, and the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. 
United States Excessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFF. L. REV. 783, 806–13 (1975) 
(discussing the influence of Cesare Beccaria and other Enlightenment thinkers). 
 18. Bessler, supra note 15, at 318. 
 19. Id. at 305 (discussing the influence of Cesare Beccaria’s bestselling 1760s treatise, 
On Crimes and Punishments); see also Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 897–98; Schwartz & 
Wishingrad, supra note 17, at 808–13. 
 20. Bessler, supra note 15, at 305; Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 813–15; see also PHILA. 
SOC’Y FOR ALLEVIATING THE MISERIES OF PUB. PRISONS, CONSTITUTION OF THE 
PHILADELPHIA SOCIETY FOR ALLEVIATING THE MISERIES OF PUBLIC PRISONS 3–4 
(1806), https://archive.org/details/101292180.nlm.nih.gov [http://perma.cc/XB6U-BK9E] 
(arguing for reform of both the “degrees and modes of punishment”). 
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prohibition on “cruel and unusual” treatment as the Eighth 
Amendment.21 This Article provides the first comprehensive 
exploration of slavery jurisprudence as it relates to the law of 
punishment.22 In particular, this Article draws comparisons between 
modern interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century interpretations of the common law and statutory 
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” of slaves. 
In so doing, this Article offers a two-tiered critique of current 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, one that should resonate with 
both adherents and critics of current Eighth Amendment doctrine. 
First, consistent with the conclusions that already have been drawn 
from legal history, the jurisprudence of slavery demonstrates that the 
words “cruel” and “unusual” did not simply purport to regulate the 
mode of punishment, but also called for an inquiry into the 
excessiveness of punishment.23 To some extent, the pre-twentieth-
century law of slavery offers a richer and more detailed exploration of 
the meaning of these terms than the contemporaneous law of 
punishment, and it points to an interpretation that is in sharp tension 
with those who adhere to the view that the Eighth Amendment only 
prohibits certain categories of punishment.24 One should be careful 
not to overstate the point: as this Article discusses below, the law of 
slavery left much to be desired in terms of application.25 It is 
presumably unsurprising that courts mouthed the words of 
“decency,”26 “humanity[,]”27 and “excessive punishment”28 even as 
they protected abusive slaveholding behavior and the institution of 
slavery itself.29 But as a matter of formal law, the jurisprudence of 
slavery contemplates the possibility that an excessive punishment 
 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. John Bessler’s work is an exception, at least to the extent that he discusses in some 
detail the law of slavery in the context of an argument about the permissibility of capital 
punishment. See Bessler, supra note 15, at 333–37. But Bessler’s description of the law of 
slavery is not meant to advance an argument about the law of punishment, but rather to 
provide a narrative about how the permissibility of capital punishment has gradually been 
restricted over time. 
 23. See infra Section II.B. 
 24. See infra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 167–73 and accompanying text. 
 26. See, e.g., Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665 (1844) (holding that if a slave is 
punished in a manner that is offensive to “decency[,]” the offender can be charged with 
inflicting cruel and unusual punishment). 
 27. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text. 
 29. A similar observation could be made about the few nineteenth-century cases that 
address the rights of prisoners. 
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824 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
could be both cruel and unusual even if it was administered through 
“usual” means, such as a whip.30 
Second, and equally as critical for those who would align Eighth 
Amendment principles with “evolving standards of decency,” there 
are many ways in which the law of punishment of the last fifty years 
has not advanced far beyond the law of slavery of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. This is most obvious in the context of the use of 
force against both prisoners and slaves. When one examines the 
standards under which civil or criminal liability could arise from 
abusive force used against a slave—courts and statutes generally 
prohibited force that was used willfully and for the purpose of 
revenge or harm and beyond the scope of “moderate correction”—it 
is eerily similar to the “malicious and sadistic” standard regulating the 
use of force against prisoners.31 Again, one must be careful not to 
over-claim here—many states only contemplated punishing 
slaveholders who killed or maimed through the use of immoderate 
force,32 while prison officials are liable whether they kill or merely 
injure a prisoner.33 And slaves had no right to recover damages or 
institute actions—to the extent that their injuries were recognized by 
courts as worthy of a civil remedy, it was to compensate a slaveholder 
for his loss.34 But nonowners of slaves were theoretically accountable 
both civilly and criminally when they injured slaves through excessive 
“correction,”35 and the inability of slaves to institute civil actions did 
not leave them formally unprotected by criminal law. 
The failings of the law of punishment will not shock close 
observers. But with the law of slavery in the background, perhaps 
even experts in the law and practice of punishment will see a stark 
picture. There is a given narrative that runs throughout prison 
scholarship of the transition from the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries’ “hands-off” doctrine to more judicial oversight in 
the 1960s and ‘70s, with retrenchment in the last thirty years.36 This 
narrative is attractive because it is consistent with trends in other 
 
 30. See infra Section II.A. 
 31. See infra Part III. 
 32. See, e.g., infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 33. Indeed, to be civilly liable, a prison official need not cause any harm other than 
increasing the risk of future harm to a prisoner. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 
33 (1993). 
 34. See infra notes 112–20 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text. 
 36. See generally JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 351–
52 (9th ed. 2010) (describing the hands-off doctrine and the conditions of confinement 
litigation that followed). 
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institutional reform litigation, while also suggesting some incremental 
measure of progress. As this Article argues, however, the nineteenth-
century description of prisoners as “slave[s] of the State” may be 
more than mere rhetorical flourish even now.37 To the extent that the 
modern Supreme Court aligns its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
with respect for human dignity,38 the Court should appreciate how 
shallow that conception is in operation. Indeed, there is ample 
evidence that, despite the promise of judicial regulation of prisoners’ 
treatment, courts often fall short of guaranteeing minimum standards 
of decency in prisons and jails even after years of judicial 
intervention.39 
Part I of this Article outlines our current understanding of the 
Eighth Amendment and its history. Although the Supreme Court has 
applied the Amendment to regulate both the content of criminal 
sentences and the treatment of prisoners held in confinement, there is 
a contentious debate about whether the Court has been true to the 
Amendment’s original meaning. Legal historians have intervened in 
the debate with useful insights, but have failed to discuss the slavery 
jurisprudence examined here, even though the cases offer a detailed 
and contemporaneous examination of the very words used in the 
Amendment. 
Part II canvasses seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-
century law, which provided the basic principles by which the 
treatment of slaves was theoretically regulated. Positive law generally 
 
 37. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 795–96 (1871) (“A convicted 
felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in the penitentiary instead of 
with death, is subject while undergoing that punishment, to all the laws which the 
Legislature in its wisdom may enact for the government of that institution and the control 
of its inmates. For the time being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a 
state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only 
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its humanity 
accords to him.”); see also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS 
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 31 (2012). Notably, because convict 
leasing was used as a tool in the post-Reconstruction South to perpetuate the economic 
and political subjugation of African-Americans, prisoners in the late-eighteenth and early-
nineteenth centuries experienced material conditions and treatment nearly 
indistinguishable from slavery. See DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER 
NAME 56–57 (2008). 
 38. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
 39. See id. at 1926–28 (detailing decades of litigation involving medical and mental 
health treatment); see also Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of 
N.Y., to The Honorable Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Joseph Ponte, Comm’r of the 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., and Zachary Carter, Corp. Counsel of N.Y.C. (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/SDNY%20Rikers
%20Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/99A4-N863] (detailing the results of an investigation into 
the treatment of juveniles held in detention at Rikers Island). 
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required that any “punishment” of slaves be graduated and 
proportional, while common law purported to require that slaves be 
treated according to some minimum standard of decency. As with the 
law of punishment, the application of the law of slavery did not live 
up to these principles—the practice of slavery involved everyday 
treatment that was cruel and barbarous. But for the purposes of this 
Article, which seeks to mine a new source of understanding as to the 
contemporaneous meaning given to the words “cruel and unusual,” 
slavery jurisprudence offers a rich vein. 
Part III discusses the ramifications of the law of slavery for the 
law of punishment. For originalists, slavery jurisprudence offers a 
reason, in addition to some that have already been offered by legal 
historians, to be comfortable with the Supreme Court’s 
proportionality jurisprudence. For those who find within the Eighth 
Amendment a commitment to discerning and applying “evolving 
standards of decency[,]”40 slavery jurisprudence should raise 
questions about the application of that standard to current problems 
in prison-conditions litigation. In this sense, the law of slavery may be 
the fun-house mirror for the law of punishment—in some ways, the 
reflection will be familiar, and in other ways, disturbing. 
I.  THE INCOMPLETE HISTORY OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and 
unusual punishments.”41 Perhaps more than any other single 
provision of the Bill of Rights, it has come to occupy multiple roles in 
regulating criminal justice, which this Article will briefly sketch 
before turning to the origins of the Punishments Clause.42 When a 
 
 40. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
 41. For a more detailed discussion of different aspects of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, see generally Reinert, supra note 13, at 61–68. 
 42. Indeed, some scholars have criticized Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for being 
so capacious. See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A 
Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 78 (2010) (arguing that 
proportionality jurisprudence should not permit challenges to the length of a sentence); 
Claus, supra note 15, at 45; Steven Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: 
The Supreme Court’s Tortured Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 KY. L.J. 
107, 107 (1996) (describing the Court’s proportionality jurisprudence as “confused”); 
Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 527, 528 (2008) (criticizing the Court for failing to “provide practical guidance or a 
coherent theoretical framework for analyzing proportionality challenges”); Youngjae Lee, 
The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (2005) 
(describing Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as “ineffectual and incoherent”); Tom 
Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 478 
(2005); Stinneford, supra note 12, at 1740–41. 
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criminal defendant receives a sentence upon conviction, the Eighth 
Amendment imposes two related constraints: (1) the punishment, 
including the length of any incarceration, must meet a loose 
proportionality test in order to pass constitutional muster;43 and (2) 
the punishment must accord with “evolving standards of decency.”44 
And after the sentence is handed down, the Eighth Amendment, 
again through “evolving standards of decency,” regulates the 
conditions to which prisoners are subjected, including the medical and 
mental health care that a prisoner receives; the force that may be used 
by officers to impose order; the supervision that is required to ensure 
safety within prisons; and the material conditions that form the daily 
lived experience in prisons such as living space, food, and sanitation.45 
 
 43. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(articulating a “narrow” proportionality principle). 
 44. The “evolving standards of decency” doctrine was introduced in Trop, 356 U.S. at 
101 (plurality opinion). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
has found prison sentences to be unconstitutional—under either proportionality or 
“evolving standards” analysis—in only a handful of noncapital cases involving adults, see 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983); Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion); Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (1910), and generally has held that sentences of terms 
of years will almost never be found to be unconstitutional, see Ewing v. California, 538 
U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76–77 (2003); Harmelin, 501 U.S. 
at 996; Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75 (1982) (per curiam). To the extent that the 
Court has been at all receptive to arguments regarding the constitutionality of both capital 
and noncapital sentences, the defendant has had specific characteristics that rendered a 
particular punishment inappropriate. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of mandatory life-without-
parole sentences on juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75–76 (2010) (noting that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of life-without-parole sentences on 
juveniles who do not commit capital crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571–73 
(2005) (holding that a death penalty sentence for juveniles violates the Eighth 
Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding it unconstitutional to 
execute a defendant who is mentally retarded); cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 
446–47 (2008) (finding the death penalty disproportionate for the conviction of a crime 
that did not involve death). 
 45. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (holding that handcuffing a 
prisoner to a hitching post without water or bathroom access for seven hours, well after 
the need to reclaim order had dissipated, violated the Eighth Amendment); Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 849 (1994) (holding that the Eighth Amendment could be violated 
if an official failed to protect a prisoner from violence caused by other prisoners); Helling 
v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (holding that deliberate indifference to second-hand 
tobacco smoke subjected prisoners to unsafe conditions in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (holding that when prison 
officials “maliciously and sadistically” use force, the Eighth Amendment is violated); 
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1991) (requiring access to minimum standards of 
warmth and exercise); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (requiring conditions 
of confinement that meet minimum standards); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) 
(concluding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” violates 
the Eighth Amendment); Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that an 
assault invited by a staff member’s statements to other inmates is actionable under the 
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Thus, it is fair to say that the Eighth Amendment operates as a 
constraint on state action, albeit a loose one, from the day that a 
criminal sentence is imposed until the prisoner is released from 
custody. 
The Court has not arrived at this point in its jurisprudence 
without controversy. Almost from the start, dissenting Justices have 
expressed discomfort and disagreement with the Court’s 
interpretation of the Punishments Clause, especially the 
proportionality principle that a majority of the Court has embraced. 
In Trop v. Dulles,46 for instance, four dissenters cautioned the Court 
against making policy judgments about appropriate punishments that 
would intrude upon the political branches.47 Again in Solem v. Helm,48 
four dissenters objected that there was no support for a general 
Eighth Amendment proportionality principle and argued instead that 
the Eighth Amendment only prohibited certain modes of 
punishment.49 A vocal minority has kept up the drumbeat through the 
years.50 Over time, some Justices have also objected to the Court’s 
reliance on the Eighth Amendment to regulate conditions of 
confinement.51 
 
Eighth Amendment); LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 72–73 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding 
actionable an Eighth Amendment claim where a prisoner claimed prison officials’ 
deliberate indifference to asbestos exposure); Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 
1997) (noting that an assault made possible by an officer’s opening of a cell is actionable). 
 46. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
 47. See id. at 119–20 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 48. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
 49. See id. at 312–13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 50. E.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2483 (2012) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(objecting to the proportionality principle); id. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
proportionality principle and evolving standards doctrine for “abandon[ing] the original 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment”); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the Eighth Amendment doctrine on original meaning grounds); 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
proportionality principle and evolving standards doctrine on originalist grounds); Ewing v. 
California, 538 U.S. 11, 31–32 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (objecting to 
the proportionality principle as fundamentally a policy, not a legal, judgment); id. at 32 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 992 
(1991) (Scalia, J.) (recognizing, but criticizing, interpretations of Weems that support a 
proportionality principle). 
 51. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 758 n.12 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“Conditions of 
confinement are not punishment in any recognized sense of the term, unless imposed as 
part of a sentence.”); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1993) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 19 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The vast majority of this critique has focused on the original 
meaning of the Eighth Amendment.52 Thus, for both scholars and 
jurists, excavating that meaning is of vital importance, even for those 
who do not place singular reliance on originalist modes of 
interpretation. As this Article discusses in detail below, the 
Amendment’s original meaning is obscured, given the limited 
information available regarding the founders’ intent in adopting the 
Punishments Clause. 
There is very little direct information regarding the meaning 
given to the Eighth Amendment by those who voted to include it in 
the Bill of Rights. On August 17, 1789, the House of Representatives 
took up consideration of the Amendment, which had been introduced 
by James Madison.53 Representative William Smith, of the Charleston 
District of South Carolina, immediately objected to the “cruel and 
unusual” language on vagueness grounds.54 Samuel Livermore of New 
Hampshire agreed, reportedly arguing as follows: 
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which 
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no 
meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the 
terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is 
understood by excessive fines? It lies with the court to 
determine. No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; 
it is sometimes necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve 
whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we in 
[the] future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments 
because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting 
vice and deterring others from the commission of it could be 
invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt 
it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we 
ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any 
declaration of this kind.55 
According to contemporaneous accounts, no further discussion 
was had, the clause was approved by a “considerable majority[,]” and 
 
 52. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2487 (Alito, J., dissenting); Graham, 560 U.S. at 99 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 53. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 54. See id. Smith generally objected to the inclusion of a bill of rights in the 
Constitution and had already sought to delay debate over the amendments. See James W. 
Ely, Jr., “The Good Old Cause”: The Ratification of the Constitution and Bill of Rights in 
South Carolina, in THE SOUTH’S ROLE IN THE CREATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 101, 
120 (Robert J. Haws ed., 1991). 
 55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782–83. 
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debate turned to the Fourth Amendment.56 In the Senate, the 
consideration of the Eighth Amendment was even less extensive. 
Introduced to the Senate on August 25, 1789, the Senate approved 
the Amendment without discussion on September 7, 1789.57 If one 
were to plot along a spectrum the interest expressed by the First 
Congress in the various elements of the Bill of Rights, it is safe to say 
that the Eighth Amendment would lurk in the margins, barely seen. It 
certainly did not arouse the interest sparked by the First or Fourth 
Amendments.58 
Moreover, prior to its introduction in the First Congress, there is 
little evidence of public debate about the Punishments Clause. The 
only record of any discussion of the Clause outside of the halls of 
Congress comes from 1788, when James Iredell argued against the 
necessity of a Punishments Clause on several grounds.59 First, he 
disputed the logic of adopting a provision of the English Bill of 
Rights, which was meant to limit the power of the Crown, when the 
Eighth Amendment would purport to limit the power of both the 
executive and the legislature.60 Second, foreshadowing Livermore’s 
concerns, Iredell argued that the phrase was “too vague to have been 
of any consequence” and that even if the clause limited the 
government’s power more specifically, it would be of little use or 
effect.61 Finally, he questioned the need for such a limitation on the 
 
 56. Id. at 783. 
 57. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 73 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1790). 
 58. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 
455, 486–94 (1983) (discussing the debate surrounding the Freedom of the Press Clause of 
the First Amendment); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1712–21 (1996) (discussing William Cuddihy’s treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment’s history). 
 59. James Iredell, Marcus, Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New 
Constitution, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE 333, 359–60 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1888). 
 60. Id. (“It may be observed, in the first place, that a declaration against ‘cruel and 
unusual punishments’ formed part of an article in the Bill of Rights at the revolution in 
England in 1688. The prerogative of the Crown having been grossly abused in some 
preceding reigns, it was thought proper to notice every grievance they had endured, and 
those declarations went to an abuse of power in the Crown only, but were never intended 
to limit the authority of Parliament. Many of these articles of the Bill of Rights in England, 
without a due attention to the difference of the cases, were eagerly adopted when our 
constitutions were formed, the minds of men then being so warmed with their exertions in 
the cause of liberty as to lean too much perhaps towards a jealousy of power to repose a 
proper confidence in their own government. From these articles in the State constitutions 
many things were attempted to be transplanted into our new Constitution, which would 
either have been nugatory or improper. This is one of them.”). 
 61. Id. at 360. (“If to guard against punishments being too severe, the Convention had 
enumerated a vast variety of cruel punishments, and prohibited the use of any of them, let 
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power to punish, given that those who made and executed the laws 
would “themselves be subject to them,” creating an incentive “not to 
make them unnecessarily severe[.]”62 Other than Iredell’s comments, 
however, there is no record of any public dispute during the time of 
the framing about the need for a limitation on the government’s 
power to punish.63 
One explanation for the apparent innocuousness of the Eighth 
Amendment may be found in the extent to which influential 
founding-era documents already contemplated similar limitations. 
First and most obvious were those state constitutions that used the 
same language as the Eighth Amendment by prohibiting “cruel and 
unusual punishments.” James Madison’s home state of Virginia had 
adopted something close to this formulation in section 9 of its 1776 
 
the number have been ever so great, an inexhaustible fund must have been unmentioned, 
and if our government had been disposed to be cruel their invention would only have been 
put to a little more trouble. If to avoid this difficulty, they had determined, not negatively 
what punishments should not be exercised, but positively what punishments should, this 
must have led them into a labyrinth of detail which in the original constitution of a 
government would have appeared perfectly ridiculous, and not left a room for such 
changes, according to circumstances, as must be in the power of every Legislature that is 
rationally formed. Thus when we enter into particulars, we must be convinced that the 
proposition of such a restriction would have led to nothing useful, or to something 
dangerous, and therefore that its omission is not chargeable as a fault in the new 
Constitution.”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. During ratification, there was some debate about whether there should be a 
Punishments Clause in the Constitution itself, but this appears to reflect a broader debate 
about the wisdom of having a Bill of Rights separate from the Constitution. Abraham 
Holmes, debating in Massachusetts regarding ratification of the Constitution, seemed 
concerned that, at least at that point, there was no provision that prevented Congress from 
“inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crime.” 
Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in 2 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 
IN 1787, at 1, 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (“[T]here is no constitutional check on them, 
but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild instruments of their discipline.”). 
Similar concerns were raised in 1788 by Patrick Henry and George Nicholas in Virginia, 
directly comparing the presence in Virginia’s Declaration of Rights of a “Punishment 
Clause” with the absence of such a clause in the draft of the Constitution then presented 
to the states for ratification. Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, 
in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 1, 447–48, 451–52 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888). In response to 
Henry and Nicholas’s concerns, George Mason observed that the Constitution prohibited 
torture by prohibiting compelled self-incrimination. Id. This was not a sufficient response 
from Nicholas’s perspective because a bill of rights might not be enforced as strictly as a 
constitution. Id. 
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Declaration of Rights,64 and it surely influenced his thoughts as he 
drafted the Bill of Rights. The language from the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights, in turn, derived from the English Bill of 
Rights, which provided “[t]hat excessive bail ought not to be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.”65 
In addition, several states other than Virginia had adopted 
language in their constitutions that resembled that found in the 
English Bill of Rights. North Carolina,66 Massachusetts,67 Maryland,68 
and Delaware69 each prohibited “cruel or unusual punishment.”70 
Maryland’s Declaration of Charter and Rights also contained 
additional language that regulated the substance of punishment, 
 
 64. See VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §	9 (1776) (“That excessive bail ought not to 
be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 65. Id.; see An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Setleing the 
Succession of the Crowne 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 2, §	9 (Eng.); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 
277, 286 n.10 (1983). See generally Granucci, supra note 14 (describing the histories of the 
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments in the English Bill of Rights and the 
Eighth Amendment). As a comparison, one other document with foreign provenance was 
likely influential among the founding generation: the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man, which required that punishments be “strictly and obviously necessary.” 
DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN §	8 (1789). As William Blackstone noted, what 
must be called “excessive” under the English Bill of Rights “must be left to the courts, on 
considering the circumstances of the case, to determine.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *296–300. It is noteworthy that the English and Virginian documents did 
not use the mandatory “shall” but instead the hortatory “ought,” a fact often overlooked 
by scholars. See David Thomas Konig, Natural Rights, Bills of Rights, and the People’s 
Rights in Virginia Constitutional Discourse, 1787–1791, in THE SOUTH’S ROLE IN THE 
CREATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 33, 36–39 (Robert J. Haws ed., 1991). 
 66. N.C. CONST. art. I, §	10 (1776); see also Ratification of the Constitution by the State 
of North Carolina (Nov. 21, 1789), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 266, 276–90 (1894) (adopting the 
language of the Eighth Amendment). This difference is not insignificant, as many courts 
have noted. See, e.g., People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 (Mich. 1992) (discussing 
differences between the text of the Michigan Constitution and the Eighth Amendment); 
see also In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921, 927 (Cal. 1972) (analyzing California’s punishments 
clause, which is phrased in the disjunctive); People v. Kellogg, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 532 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he scope of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution is 
not limited by the scope of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
may prohibit cruel or unusual punishments that may not be cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment.”). 
 67. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVI (1780). 
 68. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 14 (1776) (prohibiting “cruel and unusual 
pains and penalties” and counseling avoidance of “sanguinary laws”); id. art. 22 
(prohibiting “cruel or unusual punishments”). 
 69. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS §	16 (1776). 
 70. John Bessler has suggested that it is unclear that the distinction between the 
disjunctive “or” and the conjunctive “and” carried significant consequence. See Bessler, 
supra note 15, at 313. 
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prohibiting laws that “inflict cruel and unusual pains and penalties.”71 
And the 1787 Northwest Ordinance extended to inhabitants of the 
Territory several rights, including the right to be free of cruel and 
unusual punishments and the requirement that fines be “moderate.”72 
But much like the lack of evidence of any deliberation regarding 
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment,73 the origins of state 
constitutional provisions with similar language is opaque at best. 
Thus, legal historians attempting to triangulate the original meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment have turned to the moral and legal 
commentary that was most influential among the founding 
generation. John Stinneford, for instance, has painstakingly traced 
intellectual discourse to seek to understand contemporaneous 
meanings of the words “cruel” and “unusual.”74 Samuel Pillsbury and 
John Bessler have similarly found evidence of original meaning in the 
founders’ prior experience with the British monarchy, Enlightenment 
critiques of torture, and other intellectual commentary.75 And most 
historians have noted the deep influence of both William Blackstone 
and Cesare Beccaria, whose ideas appear to have influenced the 
founders’ concerns about cruelty and the excessiveness of 
punishments.76 
 
 71. MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 14 (1776) (prohibiting “unusual pains and 
penalties” and counseling avoidance of “sanguinary laws”). A prior draft had prohibited 
“unusual pains and penalties, unknown at common law.” See Dan Friedman, The History, 
Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 
637, 656 (1998). 
 72. AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO OF 1787, reprinted in HOWARD W. PRESTON, 
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606–1863, at 241, 247 (3d ed., New 
York, G. P. Putnam's Sons 1893). 
 73. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 74. See Stinneford, supra note 12, at 1745–46 (arguing that the common 
understanding of the word “unusual” equated the term with “government practices that 
are contrary to ‘long usage’ or ‘immemorial usage’	”). See generally John F. Stinneford, 
Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 899 (2011) (using historical material to demonstrate that the original meaning of the 
Eighth Amendment is consistent with modern proportionality review). 
 75. See Bessler, supra note 15, at 315–17; Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 896–98. 
Montesquieu, as one example, spoke against the imposition of “cruel” and 
disproportionate punishment. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 6 THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS chs. 12, 16 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1750) (broadly discussing the need for 
punishments to be proportionate and not cruel). 
 76. Bessler, supra note 15, at 305 (discussing the influence of Cesare Beccaria); id. at 
318 (discussing Blackstone’s influence); Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 897; Schwartz & 
Wishingrad, supra note 17, at 806–13 (discussing the influence of Cesare Beccaria and 
other Enlightenment thinkers); Stinneford, supra note 74, at 927–28, 956–58. As 
Blackstone noted, a “prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity, and neither be 
loaded with needless fetters, or subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely 
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 These historical accounts provide useful insights into the 
Eighth Amendment’s potential meaning to the founders. For 
instance, historians have concluded that the founders were extremely 
familiar with a principle of proportionality in punishment as one 
possible anti-cruelty principle.77 But while this work has made great 
strides in identifying some of the principles that no doubt influenced 
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment, it has neglected a rich source 
of information: eighteenth- and nineteenth-century positive law and 
legal doctrine prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment” in the 
context of slavery. It is this doctrine to which the Article now turns. 
II.  THE CONTOURS OF THE PERMISSIBLE PUNISHMENT OF SLAVES 
At first glance, it may seem strange, even inappropriate, to turn 
to the law of slavery to understand the Eighth Amendment. After all, 
slavery was an institution that traded on the dehumanization and 
subjugation of persons who committed no crimes and caused no social 
harm; prison is intended as punishment for past misconduct. This 
Article will address these and other objections in due time but for 
now will merely observe that, to the extent we care about what the 
words “cruel and unusual punishment[]” meant at the time of the 
founding and beyond, slavery jurisprudence is useful precisely 
because the standard adopted for the treatment of slavery was 
identical in most jurisdictions to the Eighth Amendment’s text. And 
as will be discussed below, courts regularly offered interpretations of 
these words when purporting to regulate the treatment of slaves. 
Conversely, nineteenth-century judges had little opportunity to 
provide constitutional interpretations of the Eighth Amendment, 
primarily because of the then-limited reach of federal criminal and 
constitutional law.78 
A. Statutory Regulation of the Treatment of Slaves 
Attempts to regulate the abuses of slavery began in the 
seventeenth century, when some colonies in which slavery was lawful 
adopted positive law that purported to protect slaves from extreme 
 
requisite for the purpose of confinement only.” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *293–300. Blackstone, in turn, traced the origin of the principle of 
excessiveness, at least as it related to fines, back to Magna Carta. Id. at *379–80. 
 77. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 78. See Reinert, supra note 13, at 57. In addition, the challenges brought in federal 
court were deemed insubstantial. Id. n.16. State courts adjudicating similar clauses of their 
own constitutions were busier, with some finding criminal sentences so excessive as to be 
invalid. Id. at 58–61 & nn.20–26 (discussing cases). 
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instances of mistreatment. As this Article discusses in further detail 
below, the colonies took varying approaches to this problem; but for 
those that chose to attempt regulation, the focus was often on 
reducing “cruelty.” And in some colonies, this term carried with it an 
implication that slaveholders and others should be “moderate” or 
“proportionate” in the pain they inflicted on slaves for perceived 
transgressions. Thus, the positive law that emerged between the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries is consistent with the account 
given by legal historians—that the contemporaneous meaning given 
to the words used in the Eighth Amendment encompassed a 
proportionality principle.79 
Virginia was the oldest British-American colony and the first to 
introduce and legalize slavery.80 Therefore, not surprisingly, it played 
a central role in developing the law of slavery.81 In the 1600s, Virginia 
had enacted statutes purporting to restrict slaveholders from 
imposing cruel punishment on slaves, while excusing slave killings 
caused accidentally while “correcting” them.82 By 1705, Virginia 
expanded the scope of regulation to include penalties for those who 
abused servants or slaves without a slaveholder’s permission.83 And 
by 1748, slaveholders were prohibited by statute from giving 
“immoderate correction,” or else face the risk of criminal 
punishment.84 In 1769 legislation, Virginians rejected dismemberment 
 
 79. See Bessler, supra note 15, at 305; Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 897–99; Stinneford, 
supra note 74, at 938–60. 
 80. Philip J. Schwarz, Twice Condemned: Slaves and the Criminal Laws of Virginia, 
1705–1865, at 16 (1988). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See An Act About the Casuall Killing of Slaves Act I (Va. 1669), reprinted in 2 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 270 (William W. 
Hening ed., 1819–1823); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 
1619–1860, at 163 (1999) (citing a 1669 Act that provided that if slaves resisted anyone 
correcting them and “by the extremity of coercion” were killed, the death would not be 
considered felonious); see also Act of 1799, ch. 9, §§	1–2 (Tenn.), reprinted in 
COMPILATION OF THE STATUTES OF TENNESSEE OF A GENERAL AND PERMANENT 
NATURE FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PRESENT TIME 
676–77 (R. L. Caruthers and A. O. P. Nicholson eds., 1836) (criminalizing the willful 
killing of a slave with malice aforethought, except where the slave dies “under moderate 
correction”). 
 83. See An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves §§	1, 7, 15 (Va. 1705), reprinted in 3 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 
FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 447–51 (William 
W. Hening ed., 1819–1823). In 1723, however, Virginia turned its back on common law 
principles and excused from criminal liability anyone who killed a slave “by reason of any 
stroke or blow given, during his or her correction.” MORRIS, supra note 82, at 164. 
 84. See An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves §	5 (Va. 1748), reprinted in 5 THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA FROM THE 
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as a punishment for escaped slaves who refused to return and those 
who raided plantations for sustenance, explaining that the 
punishment was “often disproportioned to the offence, and contrary 
to the principles of humanity.”85 Thus, by the time the Eighth 
Amendment was adopted, in large part based on the advocacy of 
Virginians George Mason and James Madison, the law of slavery in 
Virginia equated cruel treatment of slaves with disproportionate 
punishment. 
Like Virginia, many other colonies that regulated the treatment 
of slaves by statute during the pre-Revolutionary period were focused 
on limiting cruelty. But their conception of the content of the word 
“cruel” varied significantly. South Carolina, for instance, had joined 
Virginia as one of the first states to enact positive law relating to the 
treatment of slaves. In 1690, the Palmetto State provided that no 
criminal liability would attach to any owner who killed or maimed a 
slave as punishment “for running away or other offence,” but 
criminalized the killing of a slave “out of wilfulness, wantonness, or 
bloody-mindedness[.]”86 By 1722, the South Carolina legislature used 
different language—criminalizing the killing of slaves willfully or “out 
of cruelty”—to the same effect.87 And in 1740, South Carolina 
purported to limit the amount of time that slaves could be put to 
“hard labour” and imposed a monetary penalty for “cruelly” scalding 
or burning a slave, cutting out his tongue, putting out his eye, or 
depriving him of any limb.88 The same law, purporting to “restrain 
and prevent barbarity being exercised towards slaves,” criminalized 
 
FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE IN THE YEAR 1619, at 547 (William W. Hening ed., 
1819–1823). 
 85. SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 21–22. In the same stroke, Virginia approved of the 
practice of castrating slaves convicted of attempted rape of white women. Id. at 22. 
 86. An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, 7 Stat. 346 (S.C. 1690), reprinted in 7 
THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 346 (David McCord ed., 1840) 
[hereinafter SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES]. A 1712 act “for the better ordering and 
governing of	.	.	.	slaves” contained similar provisions with different penalties. 7 Stat. 363, 
§	30 (S.C. 1712), in SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES, supra, at 352, 363. 
 87. An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other Slaves, 7 
Stat. 381 (S.C. 1722), in SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES, supra note 86, at 381; see also An 
Act for the Better Ordering of Negroes and Other Slaves, 7 Stat. 393, §	28 (S.C. 1735), 
reprinted in SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES, supra note 86, at 393 (using the words “cruelly 
or willfully kill”) (emphasis added). As an 1848 decision summarized it, “as the slaves 
became more civilized by their intercourse with the whites, not only were the penalties 
greatly increased, but the offence of killing them was described by words more extensive 
in their signification, so as to include other killing than what would be denominated 
murder.” State v. Fleming, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 464, 468 (S.C. Ct. App. 1848). 
 88. An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other Slaves in 
This Province, No. 670, §	37 (S.C. 1740), reprinted in SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES, supra 
note 86, at 411 (emphasis added).  
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willful murder of slaves, killing a slave through “undue correction,” 
and “cruel punishment.”89 
Other jurisdictions in which slavery was lawful also enacted 
legislation in the eighteenth century related to the treatment of slaves, 
some of which reflects principles of proportionality. In 1715, 
Maryland prohibited slaveholders from “unreasonably [burdening 
slaves] beyond their strength with labor,	.	.	.	excessively beat[ing] and 
abus[ing] them,” and theoretically provided the remedy of release 
from slavery upon a slaveholder’s third offense.90 Mississippi and 
Alabama had statutes from the colonial era that prohibited masters 
from inflicting “cruel or unusual” punishments on slaves.91 Between 
1765 and 1770, Georgia established a more detailed statutory 
framework for addressing the treatment of slaves by slaveholders and 
others. Seeking to restrain slaveholders from exercising “unnecessary 
rigour or wanton cruelty” over slaves, Georgia prohibited anyone 
from willfully murdering a slave, and from “inflict[ing] any other cruel 
punishments, other than by whipping or beating	.	.	.	or by putting irons 
on, or confining or imprisoning such slave.”92 The members of the 
Georgia legislature considered themselves advanced in this respect, 
observing that “cruelty is not only highly unbecoming those who 
profess themselves Christians, but is odious in the eyes of all men who 
have any sense of virtue or humanity.”93 Needless to say, the Georgia 
legislature’s sense of cruelty was not well developed, although it did 
categorize the following as “cruel” punishments: cutting out a slave’s 
tongue, putting out an eye, castration, scalding, burning, or 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. WORTHINGTON G. SNETHEN, THE BLACK CODE OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA, IN FORCE SEPTEMBER 1ST, 1848, at 9 (1848). 
 91. Andrew Fede, Legitimized Violent Slave Abuse in the American South, 1619–1865: 
A Case Study of Law and Social Change in Six Southern States, 29 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 93, 
131 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 92. An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves Within this Province and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned; and to Prevent the Inveigling and Carrying Away Slaves 
from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers pmbl., §	42 (Ga. 1770), reprinted in 2 THE 
EARLIEST PRINTED LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF GEORGIA, 1755–1770, at 275, 291 (1978) 
[hereinafter LAWS OF GEORGIA] (emphasis added); see also An Act for the Better 
Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves in This Province, and to Prevent the 
Inveigling or Carrying Away Slaves from their Masters or Employers pmbl. (Ga. 1765), in 
LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra, at 14. 
 93. An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves Within this Province and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned; and to Prevent the Inveigling and Carrying Away Slaves 
from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers §	42 (Ga. 1770), reprinted in LAWS OF 
GEORGIA, supra note 92, at 291. 
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amputation of a limb or member.94 Moreover, Georgia gave white 
persons the power to “moderately correct” a slave who was out of the 
house or plantation where the slave lived and who refused to submit 
to an “examination” by the white person.95 
Some nonslaveholding colonies also purported to regulate the 
treatment of slaves by slaveholders and others. Thus, a 1718 New 
Hampshire law imposed capital punishment for the willful killing of a 
slave.96 New York similarly regulated the treatment of slaves at the 
turn of the eighteenth century,97 and by 1798, New Jersey permitted 
indictment for the “cruel” treatment of slaves.98 
By the late-eighteenth century, state legislatures began to extend 
greater legal protection to slaves, at least on the surface. Some state 
constitutions included provisions providing for the punishment of 
those who “maliciously” maimed or killed slaves.99 Between 1788 and 
1816, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia each 
extended their criminal law so as to encompass or increase the 
punishment of whites who killed slaves.100 By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, numerous legislative provisions protected against 
“cruel” or “unusual” punishments (or both) including laws in South 
Carolina,101 Georgia,102 Alabama,103 and the Territories of 
 
 94. Id. 
 95. An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves Within this Province and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned; and to Prevent the Inveigling and Carrying Away Slaves 
from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers §	5 (Ga. 1770), reprinted in LAWS OF 
GEORGIA, supra note 92, at 277. 
 96. An Act for Restraining Inhuman Severities, ch. 25 (N.H. 1718), reprinted in 2 
LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 292 (Albert Stillman Batchellor ed., 1913). 
 97. See An Act for Regulateing Slaves, ch. 123 (N.Y. 1702), reprinted in 1 THE 
COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK FROM THE YEAR 1664 TO THE REVOLUTION 519–21 
(James B. Lyon ed., 1894) 
 98. An Act Respecting Slaves, Patterson’s Laws 307, Rev. L. 369, §	15 (N.J. 1798), 
reprinted in LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 369, 372 (Joseph Justice ed., 1821). 
 99. MORRIS, supra note 82, at 172 (noting that four states included provisions to this 
effect in their constitutions). 
 100. MORRIS, supra note 82, at 172–74; see also SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 24–25 n.35 
(discussing the slave code in Virginia); An Act Making the Beating of Any Slave or Slaves 
the Property of Another an Indictable Offence, ch. 56 (Tenn. 1813), reprinted in 2 LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 131 (Edward Scott ed., 1821) (criminalizing the beating of 
another’s slave when done wantonly and without sufficient cause). In 1798, North Carolina 
criminalized the murder of a slave except when the cause was “moderate correction.” An 
Act to Prevent the Wilful and Malicious Killing of Slaves, ch. 31 (N.C. 1798), reprinted in 
THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 975 (Walter Clark ed., 1904). North 
Carolina had adopted a law in 1723 that punished the willful murder of a slave. See 
MORRIS, supra note 82, at 164. 
 101. See Act to Amend Sec. 37 of the Act of 1740 (S.C. 1858), in JOHN C. HURD, 2 THE 
LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 100 (1858) (summarizing an 
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Mississippi,104 Texas,105 Louisiana,106 Utah,107 and New Mexico.108 
Thus, when Thomas R. Cobb published his 1858 proslavery tract, he 
could claim with some credibility that, at least on the surface, positive 
law in the states served to protect slaves from “cruel[,]” “inhuman[,]” 
“excessive[,]” and “unusual” punishments by slaveholders and 
others.109 And the common understanding of these terms was that 
 
1858 South Carolina law providing that “if any person, being the owner of any slave, or 
having the care, management, or control of any slave, shall inflict on such slave any cruel 
or unusual punishment, such person, on conviction thereof under indictment, shall be 
fined and imprisoned at the discretion of the Court”—but nothing shall prevent an owner 
or overseer “from inflicting on such slave such punishment as may be necessary for the 
good government of the same”). In 1823, South Carolina regulated slave patrols by 
providing for a monetary penalty, to be paid to a slaveholder, if any white person 
“wantonly” beat or abused a slave without authority. John B. O’Neall, Negro Law of 
South Carolina, reprinted in 2 STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 
117, 160 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988). 
 102. See The Penal Code of the State of Georgia, Div. 12, §§	34–37 (Ga. 1816) 
(providing for punishment for cruelty); MORRIS, supra note 82, at 184 (noting that an 1816 
law prohibited owners from “unnecessary and excessive whipping”); An Act to Alter and 
Amend the Twelfth Section of the Thirteenth Division of the Penal Code of This State 
(Ga. 1851), reprinted in ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 
268 (Samuel J. Bay ed., 1852) (prohibiting cruel treatment of slaves and inserting “beating, 
cutting, or wounding, or by cruelly and unnecessarily biting or tearing with dogs”). 
 103. See Ala. Laws tit. 5, ch. 4, §	2043 (1852), reprinted in THE CODE OF ALABAMA 
390 (John J. Ormond, Arthur P. Bagby & George Goldthwaite eds., 1852) (“The master 
must treat his slave with humanity and must not inflict upon him any cruel 
punishment	.	.	.	.”). 
 104. An Act Respecting Slaves, ch. 27, §§	15–16 (Miss. 1805), reprinted in THE 
STATUTES OF THE MISSISSIPPI TERRITORY 385 (Samuel Terrell ed., 1807) (“[W]hereas it 
has been the humane policy of all civilized nations, where slavery has been permitted, to 
protect this useful, but degraded class of men, from cruelty and oppression	.	.	.	no cruel or 
unusual punishment shall be inflicted on any slave within this territory.”). 
 105. See An Act Concerning Slaves, 4 T.L. 171, §	3 (Texas 1840), reprinted in 2 THE 
LAWS OF TEXAS 1822–1897, at 172 (H.P.N. Gammel ed., 1898) (imposing fines for any 
person who cruelly treats or abuses a slave). 
 106. See The Civil Code, bk. I, tit. VI, ch. 3, art. 173 (La. 1825), reprinted in CIVIL 
CODE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 28 (Thomas Gibbes Morgan ed., 1854) (“The slave is 
entirely subject to the will of his master, who may correct and chastise him, though not 
with unusual rigor, nor so as to maim or mutilate him, or to expose him to the danger of 
loss of life, or to cause his death.”); Black Code, 1856 La. Revised Statutes §§	72, reprinted 
in 2 HURD, supra note 101, at 165; 1806 La. Law, ch. 11, §	56, reprinted in 2 HURD, supra 
note 101, at 158 (providing a penalty for the cruel punishment of slaves). 
 107. Act in Relation to Service, Laws of 1855, ch. 17, §	6 (Utah), reprinted in 2 HURD, 
supra note 101, at 214. 
 108. An Act to Provide for the Protection of Property in Slaves in this Territory, ch. 26, 
§	18 (N.M. 1859), reprinted in LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO 76 (A. de 
Marle ed., 1859) (providing for the punishment of an owner for cruel treatment). 
 109. See THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 98–99 (1858) (“The general principle would be, that 
the master’s right to enforce obedience and subordination on the part of the slave should, 
as far as possible, remain intact. Whatever goes beyond this, and from mere wantonness or 
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they regulated both the mode and degree of punishments inflicted on 
slaves. 
B. Judicial Regulation of the Punishment of Slaves 
By the mid-nineteenth century, with positive law in place to 
theoretically limit abuse of slaves according to the “cruel and 
unusual” standard, courts had ample opportunity to review 
allegations of excessive punishment of slaves in both the criminal and 
civil contexts. Slaveholders, overseers, and others were occasionally 
prosecuted for injuring, maiming, and killing slaves. More commonly, 
slaveholders brought suit against others who had harmed or killed a 
slave in which the slaveholder claimed a property interest. Indeed, 
courts were called upon to determine whether treatment of a slave 
constituted “cruel” or “unusual” punishment far more often than they 
had to interpret punishment clauses of the federal or state 
constitutions.110 In the course of their interpretation, courts 
emphasized two overriding principles: first, that slaves were not to be 
subjected to “immoderate” or “excessive” punishments; and second, 
that where an accused or civil defendant was motivated by malice, 
revenge, or cruelty, rather than a desire to “correct” a slave, he had 
transgressed the bonds of “decency” or “humanity.”111 
1.  Cases Concerning Civil and Criminal Liability of Nonowners 
Many of the cases from the Revolutionary period and early 1800s 
involved allegations of abusive treatment by strangers or nonowners. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, most state courts had 
recognized that slaveholders could bring a civil action against others 
who inflicted excessive punishment on slaves.112 Some Virginia courts 
 
revenge inflicts pain and suffering, especially unusual and inhuman punishments, is 
cruelty, and should be punished as such.”); see also id. at 85, 97, 98, 108 (describing various 
legal sanctions for the abuse of slaves). In his attempt to craft a proslavery legal theory, 
Cobb also called attention to the ancient history of slavery, noting that at least in Greece 
and Rome slaves were protected from cruel treatment. Id. at lxx, lxxxvi. 
 110. For a discussion of how often courts addressed the Punishments Clause in the 
context of criminal prosecutions, see Reinert, supra note 13, at 56–61. 
 111. See infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.2. 
 112. Johnson v. Lovett, 31 Ga. 187, 190–91 (1860); see also Nelson v. Bondurant, 26 
Ala. 341, 352 (1855) (allowing a civil case against a hirer who killed a slave with 
“barbarous or cruel” treatment); Hilliard v. Dortch, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 246, 247 (1824) 
(recognizing the right of an owner to bring an action where another used “immoderate” 
force on a slave); Walker v. Brown, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 179, 181–82 (1850). This right of 
recovery extended to circumstances where a bailee or an overseer went beyond “moderate 
and usual correction” that resulted in injury to a slave. Jones v. Glass, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) 
305, 307–08 (1852) (affirming taking action against a bailee); Copeland v. Parker, 25 N.C. 
(3 Ired.) 513, 514–15 (1843) (affirming a right to recover against an overseer who used a 
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also found criminal liability for those who maliciously injured a 
slave.113 As a Virginia court remarked, 
there appears no reason, arising from the relative situation of 
master and slave, why a free person should not be punished as a 
felon for maiming a slave. Whatever power our laws may give 
to a master over his slave, it is as important for the interest of 
the former, as for the safety of the latter, that a stranger should 
not be permitted to exercise an unrestrained and lawless 
authority over him.114 
The standards for assessing liability against nonowners varied 
somewhat from state to state. In Kentucky, a slaveholder could 
pursue an action against a defendant who subjected his slave to 
“inhuman[]” treatment leading to death.115 Slaveholders in Alabama, 
Georgia, and North Carolina could also pursue civil actions against 
those who injured their slaves through the application of “indecent[,]” 
“cruel[,]” “excessive[,]” or “barbarous” punishment beyond the 
bounds of “decency and humanity.”116 Similarly in Tennessee, one 
who hired out slaves from a slaveholder could not “exceed the bounds 
of moderate correction” or dispense “cruel” or “inhuman” treatment 
without risking liability.117 
Most states also distinguished between the power of slaveholders 
and others to “chastise” a slave; slaveholders were only prohibited 
 
deadly instrument against a slave who was not resisting but “only retreating against his 
orders”); Scotts v. Hume, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) 378, 378 (1821); Hoomes v. Kuhn, 8 Va. 
(4 Call) 274, 274 (1792). 
 113. Commonwealth v. Howard, 38 Va. (11 Leigh) 631, 632 (Va. Gen. 1841) 
(upholding an indictment for “violently and inhumanly assaulting and beating” the slave 
of another); Commonwealth v. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 660, 661–64 (Va. Gen. 1827) 
(holding that a “free person” who maliciously and unlawfully shoots a slave shall be guilty 
of a felony and sentenced to prison); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 158, 
158–59 (Va. Gen. 1819) (reviewing and affirming judgment against a defendant for murder 
in the second degree of a slave); Commonwealth v. Chapple, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 184, 184–
86 (Va. Gen. 1811) (holding that an 1803 law protected slaves from assault under penal 
laws, even though part of the punishment inflicted for the crime was payment of a fine to 
the injured party, and slaves could not legally hold property). Even in the pre-
Revolutionary period, Virginia authorities prosecuted and sometimes executed overseers 
who killed slaves under their authority. MORRIS, supra note 82, at 167. 
 114. Carver, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 665. 
 115. Scotts, 16 Ky. (1 Litt. Sel. Cas.) at 378; see also Carney v. Walden, 55 Ky. (16 B. 
Mon.) 388, 395–97 (Ky. 1855) (finding that a cause of action existed for an owner who 
sought to recover damages from a contractor for the death of a slave “by inhuman 
treatment”); Craig’s Adm’r v. Lee, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 96, 98 (Ky. 1853). 
 116. Nelson, 26 Ala. at 352; Johnson, 31 Ga. at 191; Hilliard, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) at 247; 
see also Jones, 35 N.C. (13 Ired.) at 307–08 (applying the principle to a bailee); Copeland, 
25 N.C. (3 Ired.) at 514–15 (applying the principle to an overseer). 
 117. James v. Carper, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 397, 400–02 (1857). 
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from inflicting “cruel and inhuman punishment” if it resulted in the 
death or maiming of their slaves.118 A bailee or someone who had 
hired out the slave, however, could be both civilly and criminally 
liable “if he or his overseer in the course of his service as such,	.	.	.	by 
cruel neglect, or by inhuman treatment, cause[d] the death of the 
slave, or impair[ed] his health, or otherwise injure[d] him.”119 Such 
liability was triggered where a nonowner neglected a sick slave, 
dispensed “inhuman treatment in the form of immoderate 
chastisement, or [inflicted] cruel treatment in failing to furnish 
necessary food, raiment and shelter.”120 
Examining cases involving slave patrols offers additional insight 
into the formal legal protections provided to slaves. Slave patrols 
originated in early slave states such as Virginia and North and South 
Carolina, and consisted of organized groups of white men who sought 
to limit the movement and behavior of slaves.121 Slave patrols were 
considered quasi-public organizations and were granted the power of 
the executive to enforce laws and the power of the judiciary to judge 
and punish.122 Because they were loosely regulated, they also carried 
the potential to devolve into mob violence, particularly when 
purporting to act on the public’s behalf.123 State courts, recognizing 
this, entertained both criminal and civil actions against patrollers 
 
 118. Craig’s Adm’r, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) at 98. 
 119. Id. at 99. 
 120. Id. 
 121. For a thorough examination of the history, purpose, and practice of slave patrols, 
see generally SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA 
AND THE CAROLINAS (2001). 
 122. DANIEL J. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1800–
1868, at 79–81 (1973) (discussing slave patrols as a system for regulating slave behavior); 
HADDEN, supra note 121, at 41–70 (describing various means by which slave patrols were 
regulated in the Carolinas and Virginia); State v. Hailey, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 11, 12–13 (1845) 
(“If punishment is to be inflicted, they must adjudge, decide, as to the question; five stripes 
may in some cases be sufficient, while others may demand the full penalty of the law.”). 
 123. See HADDEN, supra note 121, at 108 (giving an account of a South Carolina patrol 
that beat a slave to death for attending a dance that had been held without the 
slaveholder’s permission); Tomlinson v. Darnall, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 538, 542 (1859) (“The 
institution and support of the night-watch and patrol, on some plan, are indispensable to 
good order, and the subordination of slaves, and the best interests of their owners. But the 
authority conferred for these important objects must not be abused by those upon whom it 
is conferred, as it sometimes is by reckless persons.”); Kirkwood v. Miller, 37 Tenn. (5 
Sneed) 455, 460 (1858) (“Every description of mob-law, and reckless invasion of the rights 
of others, should be visited with the highest penalties. If this lawless spirit is tolerated, or 
allowed to display itself with impunity, no man would be safe, in his person or property, in 
any community. Almost any other evil would be preferable to this.”). 
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when they imposed “extreme punishment” in the course of their 
roving.124 
This case law parallels, in many ways, modern Eighth 
Amendment doctrine. First, it is clear that state courts, like many 
state legislatures, equated cruel and unusual treatment with 
“excessive” or “barbaric” “correction.” Second, state courts also 
looked to contemporaneous moral standards to understand the 
meaning of the prohibition on abusive treatment of slaves. For 
instance, Tennessee courts initially tended to distinguish between 
extracting labor from slaves, for which slaveholders could use 
essentially any means, and the killing of a slave, which could have 
criminal consequences.125 By 1850, Tennessee courts rejected the view 
that a slaveholder had the power “to maim his slave for the purpose 
of his moral reform.”126 Similarly, when the Tennessee Supreme 
Court considered a case brought by a slaveholder against a hirer 
whose overseer had killed a slave, the court distinguished between a 
lawful purpose of “correction” and the use of “instruments of torture 
to gratify his malice, intending to kill.”127 The Tennessee court 
claimed to rely on “the moral sense and humanity of the present 
age[,]”128 a parallel to the conception of the Eighth Amendment, 
which also trades on “evolving standards of decency.”129 
2.  Criminal Liability of Slaveholders 
Imposing criminal liability for the conduct of slaveholders with 
regard to their own slaves posed a challenge for many slave states. In 
Virginia, this is illustrated by the 1824 case Commonwealth v. 
 
 124. State v. Atkinson, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 65, 68 (1858) (upholding the conviction of 
defendant members of a slave patrol for inflicting “extreme punishment” on a slave 
resulting in his death); State v. Boozer, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 21, 26 (S.C. App. 1850) 
(upholding the conviction of patrol members for whipping slaves without provocation); 
Tennent v. Dendy, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 83, 84–86 (S.C. App. 1837) (permitting civil action 
against a patroller for whipping a slave); Hogg v. Keller, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 113, 
113–14 (S.C. Constitutional Ct. App. 1819) (upholding a motion for a new trial for a 
defendant who unlawfully “whipp[ed]” a slave); Tomlinson, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) at 542 
(discussing the actions of a patrol that “exceeded the bounds of moderation”). 
 125. Fields v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 156, 165 (Tenn. High Ct. Err. & App. 1829) 
(reviewing the conviction of a white man for manslaughter in the killing of a slave and 
stating that “[i]t is well said by one of the judges of North Carolina, that the master has the 
right to exact the labor of the slave—that far, the rights of the slave are suspended; but this 
gives the master no right over the life of the slave	.	.	.	.	Law, reason, Christianity and 
common humanity, all point out one way”). 
 126. Werley v. State, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 172, 175–76 (1850). 
 127. Puryear v. Thompson, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 397, 398–400 (1844). 
 128. Werley, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) at 175. 
 129. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
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Booth.130 The defendant was indicted for beating a slave while the 
slave was hired out to him. The jury found the defendant guilty, 
subject to an answer to the following question: 
Can the Defendant [Booth] be indicted and punished for the 
excessive, cruel and inhuman infliction of stripes on the slave 
Bob, while in his possession, and under his control as a hired 
slave, for the space of one month, no permanent injury having 
resulted to the said slave from such infliction?131 
The General Court of Virginia declined to answer directly, reasoning 
that for the purposes of the criminal law Booth stood in the same 
shoes as a slaveholder, and, therefore, the indictment “ought to state 
distinctly, the connection of the parties, and to shew that it is the 
excess of the punishment which is complained of, and not, that the 
right to punish at all, is questioned.”132 An assault on one’s own slave 
“becomes unlawful by subsequent excess and inhumanity,” and the 
indictment did not specifically allege the facts sufficient to establish 
those elements.133 In support, the court looked to the form 
indictments under English common law against masters abusing their 
apprentices, indicating that the law of slavery was situated in more 
general principles regarding relationships of subordination.134 
A few years later, in Commonwealth v. Turner,135 the General 
Court of Virginia declined to find as a matter of common law that a 
slaveholder could be prosecuted “for the immoderate, cruel and 
excessive beating of his own slave.”136 Reasoning that it lacked power 
to create common law crimes, the court looked to foreign jurisdictions 
where slavery had existed and to positive law.137 Finding no support in 
either of these sources for holding slaveholders liable for the nonfatal 
excessive beating of slaves,138 the court rejected the prosecution’s 
argument. To the extent that courts had recognized the liability of 
slaveholders for beating their slaves in public, the court found that the 
 
 130. 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 394 (Va. Gen. 1824). 
 131. Id. at 394. 
 132. Id. at 395. 
 133. Id. The Court emphasized that it did not address the question of whether criminal 
liability would lie in the absence of any permanent injury. Id. 
 134. Id. (citing 3 JOSEPH CHITTY, TREATISE OF THE LEGAL PREROGATIVES OF THE 
CROWN 829 (1878)). 
 135. 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (Va. Gen. 1827). 
 136. Id. at 686–87 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. at 680–83 (majority opinion). 
 138. Id. at 682–84 (reviewing the history of villenage in England and slavery among 
Jews, Romans, and Greeks to conclude that, at most, slaves were protected against fatal 
attacks by their owners). 
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reasons were rooted in the desire to protect “the harmony of society” 
and not the humanity of the slave.139 The court compared the 
situation to imposing criminal liability for the beating of a horse; 
according to the court, “it would not be pretended, that it was in 
respect to the rights of the horse, or the feelings of humanity, that this 
interposition would take place.”140 And to the extent that statutes in 
post-1788 Virginia also protected slaves from maiming, those statutes 
could not extend to excessive whipping.141 The court expressed 
distress (sincere or not) at its holding, concluding by remarking that 
“[i]t is greatly to be deplored that an offence so odious and revolting 
as this, should exist to the reproach of humanity[,]” but found that 
resolving the matter was best left to the legislature or “the tribunal of 
public opinion.”142 The line between liability for death and “mere 
injury” suggested by Turner persisted in Virginia even into the 
1850s.143 
Judge Brockenbrough dissented, and in his opinion offered a 
different view of the history and regulation of slavery. He noted that 
there was some tradition, found in Justinian’s Institutes, that 
compelled slaveholders to be dispossessed of their property if they 
were excessively severe, but this was founded on the principle “that 
no one should be allowed to misuse even his own property.”144 
Brockenbrough also referenced other relationships of subordination, 
such as parent-child, tutor-pupil, and master-servant, in which 
“superiors” could only use “moderate” correction.145 Because the 
slave was more than a thing but less than a person, Brockenbrough 
argued “his person was protected from all unnecessary, cruel, and 
inhuman punishments.”146 And by a 1788 act that repealed prior 
legislation immunizing slaveholders from criminal liability for all 
mistreatment other than that which caused death, Brockenbrough 
 
 139. Id. at 680. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 680–81. 
 142. Id. at 686. 
 143. Souther v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. (7 Gratt.) 673, 678–79 (Va. Gen. 1851) 
(upholding a murder conviction where the defendant’s slave Sam was killed by “cruel and 
excessive whipping and torture”). 
 144. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 688 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting). Indeed, Gaius, a 
Roman jurist, included a section on slavery in his textbook of Roman law in which he 
notes that, pursuant to the Constitution of the Emperor Antoninus, “neither Roman 
citizens nor any other persons subject to the rule of the Roman people are allowed to treat 
their slaves with excessive and causeless harshness.” THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS: PART I, 
TEXT WITH CRITICAL NOTES AND TRANSLATION 17 (Francis de Zulueta ed., 1946). 
 145. Turner, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 688 (Brockenbrough, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 689. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 817 (2016) 
846 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
maintained that the law since that time worked to protect slaves 
“from all inhuman torture,” even when inflicted by their owners.147 
Virginia was not alone in suggesting a distinction between the 
power of slaveholders and nonowners to inflict abuse on slaves. 
Kentucky law made a similar distinction, recognizing civil and 
criminal liability against nonowners but imposing criminal liability 
against a slaveholder only “if he intentionally murders or maims his 
slave by a single blow, or by slow degrees, and by protracted 
punishment.”148 Georgia similarly imposed criminal liability on 
slaveholders who intentionally killed their slaves, or killed them by 
imposing discipline that is “cruel and excessive.”149 And North 
Carolina punished slaveholders who killed through the application of 
“barbarities” with no “intention to correct or to chastise.”150 Thus, 
where an owner’s actions “flowed from a settled and malignant 
pleasure in inflicting pain, or a settled and malignant insensibility to 
human suffering[,]” criminal liability for a slave’s death would 
follow.151 
South Carolina used a similar standard as Virginia, North 
Carolina, Kentucky, and Georgia, although its courts appeared more 
open to finding criminal liability. As early as 1823, South Carolina 
courts upheld the conviction of a slaveholder for the willful murder of 
his slave.152 Slaveholders were similarly prosecuted for killing by 
“undue correction.”153 South Carolina courts also found slaveholders 
liable for using a “cruel” punishment, as contemplated by the state’s 
1740 law discussed above.154 
Louisiana’s case law offers a contrast with other states, because 
the territorial courts suggested that the same standards of treatment 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Craig’s Adm’r v. Lee, 53 Ky. (14 B. Mon.) 96, 98–99 (Ky. 1853). 
 149. Martin v. State, 25 Ga. 494, 511 (1858); Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545, 559 (1857) 
(prosecuting an owner for murder). The Martin court distinguished “unusual” 
punishments, which are “not necessarily, nor always the most cruel or severe.” Martin, 25 
Ga. at 511. 
 150. State v. Robbins, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 249, 253 (1855) (affirming a conviction for 
murder where a slaveholder killed a slave out of “cruelty, torture and revenge”); State v. 
Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 503–04 (1839) (upholding conviction). 
 151. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) at 504; see also Copeland v. Parker, 25 N.C. 
(3 Ired.) 513, 515 (1843) (affirming a right to recover where “shooting the slave betrayed 
passion in the overseer”). 
 152. State v. Taylor, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 483, 492–93 (S.C. Constitutional Ct. App. 
1823) (affirming a prosecution under a 1740 act for the willful murder of slave). 
 153. State v. Montgomery, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 120, 120–21 (S.C. App. Law 1840) 
(relating to the joint indictment of a husband and wife for killing a slave “by undue 
correction” under a 1740 act). 
 154. State v. Wilson, 25 S.C.L. (Chev.) 163, 165 (S.C. App. Law 1840). 
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applied to both slaveholders and nonowners who abused slaves. 
Louisiana courts barred “excessive and cruel” punishment, or 
“unusual and excessive” chastisement by overseers.155 Slaveholders 
also were prosecuted in Louisiana for “cruel” and “inhuman” 
treatment of their slaves.156 Mississippi, like Louisiana, protected 
slaves from “cruel or unusual” punishment, whether inflicted by a 
slaveholder or a stranger.157 Alabama prohibited the killing of any 
slave by “cruel	.	.	.	or inhuman” punishment,158 and in nonfatal cases, 
it prohibited the infliction of “cruel or unusual punishment.”159 In the 
District of Columbia, as early as 1806, beating a slave was an 
indictable offense,160 but it is not evident that juries were inclined to 
convict slaveholders of “cruel[]” or “inhuman[]” treatment.161 
While the states discussed above differed somewhat in their 
approach to finding criminality in the conduct of slaveholders, they 
tended to coalesce around similar descriptors. A case from Alabama 
offers perhaps the most nuanced discussion of the key terms “cruel” 
and “unusual.” In Turnipseed v. State,162 a case involving a 
prosecution for “cruel or unusual punishment,” the Alabama court 
 
 155. Miller v. Stewart, 12 La. Ann. 170, 171 (1857) (upholding a claim against an 
overseer); Kennedy v. Mason, 10 La. Ann. 519, 521 (1855); Hendricks v. Phillips, 3 La. 
Ann. 618, 618 (1848) (considering a claim against an overseer for treating slaves with 
“cruelty and inhumanity”); Bailey v. Stevens, 9 Rob. 158, 158 (La. 1844) (discussing an 
action for “brutal treatment” of slaves by an overseer). But see Martineau v. Hooper, 8 
Mart. La. 699, 700 (1820) (finding that an overseer was not civilly liable when he shot and 
killed a slave who “refused to submit” to a whipping and instead tried to escape). 
 156. State v. White, 13 La. Ann. 573, 573 (1858) (prosecuting defendants for “inhuman 
and cruel” treatment); State v. Morris, 4 La. Ann. 177, 177 (1849) (prosecuting an owner 
for the “cruel treatment” of a slave). In one noteworthy Louisiana case, a private citizen 
brought suit to compel the sale of a slave from an owner who had “cruelly beat and 
maltreated” the slave. Markham v. Close, 2 La. 581, 582 (1831). Although a jury found for 
the plaintiff, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the law that prohibited 
“cruel punishment” required that a criminal case be successfully brought before a 
slaveholder could be compelled to sell the slave. Id. at 587. 
 157. Oliver v. State, 39 Miss. 526, 539–40 (Miss. High Ct. Err. & App. 1860) (holding 
that a slaveholder cannot impose “inhuman or brutal treatment” on a slave); Scott v. 
State, 31 Miss. 473, 479 (Miss. High Ct. Err. & App. 1856) (upholding the conviction of an 
overseer for “cruel or unusual” treatment). 
 158. State v. Flanigin, 5 Ala. 477, 477, 480 (1843) (affirming conviction). 
 159. Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665 (1844); see also Gillian v. Senter, 9 Ala. 395, 
397 (1846) (holding that an overseer may not impose “immoderate punishment” that is 
“cruel, or indicative of wanton and brutal feelings”). 
 160. United States v. Lloyd, 4 D.C. (4 Cranch) 470, 470 (C.C.D.C. 1834); United States 
v. Butler, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 373, 373 (C.C.D.C. 1806). 
 161. United States v. Brockett, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 441, 441 (C.C.D.C. 1823) (finding the 
defendant not guilty but reflecting on the jury’s recommendation “that the Court should 
express their strong disapprobation of similar conduct”). 
 162. 6 Ala. 664 (1844). 
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explained that the State was not required to prove both cruel and 
unusual punishment, making the statute “sufficiently broad to 
embrace a high offence against good morals.”163 Using words that 
foreshadowed Supreme Court holdings regarding the Eighth 
Amendment, the court went on: 
Cruel, as indicating the infliction of pain of either mind or body, 
is a word of most extensive application; yet every cruel 
punishment is not, perhaps, unusual; nor, perhaps, can it be 
assumed that every uncommon infliction is cruel. But be this as 
it may, there may be punishment that is both cruel and unusual; 
thus, if a slave should be punished, even without bodily torture, 
in a manner offensive to modesty, decency and the recognized 
proprieties of social life, the offender would be chargeable in 
the broad terms employed in the indictment.164 
And in a later case, the Alabama Supreme Court used a 
proportionality concept to explain the boundaries of “cruel and 
unreasonable” punishment.165 Again in language that presages 
debates in modern Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court stated 
that “[p]unishment for a past offense, which is inflicted with a view to 
reformation, should be graduated by the nature of the offense; and 
somewhat by the fact, whether the offense has been of frequent or 
rare commission.”166 
It is important not to overstate the rhetoric of the cases discussed 
in this Section. These courts viewed the state of slavery as a tranquil 
one, and their concepts of what was “decent” or “humane” was 
skewed accordingly. Overall, the abject conditions experienced by 
slaves on a daily basis were extremely harsh and bore little indication 
of any regulation.167 As Thomas Morris has noted, it can hardly be 
said that the laws discussed herein were of real practical significance 
in protecting slaves from cruelty.168 Indeed, the laws themselves may 
have been a product of a Southern elite’s cynical attempt to respond 
to antislavery critics by demonstrating that slavery could be 
“humanize[d]” without altering the underlying brutality of the 
 
 163. Id. at 665. 
 164. Id. at 665–66. 
 165. Tillman v. Chadwick, 37 Ala. 317, 318 (1861) (“The law cannot enter into a strict 
scrutiny of the precise force employed, with the view of ascertaining that the chastisement 
had or had not been unreasonable. Still there is a boundary, and the force must not be 
grossly disproportionate to the offense.”). 
 166. Id. at 319. 
 167. BLACKMON, supra note 37, at 45, 50. 
 168. MORRIS, supra note 82, at 185–88 (summarizing appellate cases). 
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institution.169 Despite the statutory prohibitions present in many 
states, prosecutions were rarely successful or initiated, at least so far 
as one can tell from the available appellate case law.170 There was 
marginally more success in prosecuting overseers for violations of the 
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”171 As Andrew Fede 
has suggested, this might have suggested a class bias in favor of 
slaveholders, but in general, the courts’ ability to denounce violent 
slaveholder behavior while avoiding the imposition of criminal 
liability “saved the courts	.	.	.	from facing the harsh realities of 
slavery.”172 In addition, the actions against overseers were more 
consistent with the view that slaves were the property of slaveholders, 
and the power of nonowners was necessarily limited so as to protect 
that power.173 
One should also be cautious about conceptualizing these 
principles as equivalent to an affirmative right of the kind provided by 
the Eighth Amendment. As already discussed, slaves had no right to 
initiate actions to remedy excessive punishment, and slaves had a very 
limited right to forcibly resist the application of force against them. In 
Louisiana, they were denied the right to self-defense and could only 
be excused from an assault on whites when they acted in defense of a 
“master, or of the person having charge of him, or in whose [care] he 
may then be.”174 Similar provisions existed in Georgia.175 To the 
extent that a right to resist based on a threat to the slave’s person was 
found, it was based on “cruel” or “excessive” treatment by an owner 
 
 169. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 186 (2006) (discussing the impact of antislavery criticism 
on Southern professionals). 
 170. CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER: RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1817–80, at 13–18 (1998) (discussing cases from 1831, 1835, 
and 1846 in Warren County, Mississippi); Fede, supra note 91, at 143. 
 171. See, e.g., Scott v. State, 31 Miss. 473, 479 (Miss. High Ct. Err. & App. 1856) 
(upholding the conviction of an overseer for “cruel or unusual” treatment). 
 172. Fede, supra note 91, at 144. 
 173. Id. at 147 (“The overseer’s need to maintain slave discipline conflicted with the 
master’s interest in preventing unnecessary damage to slave property. Consequently, slave 
owners did sue overseers to recover monetary compensation for damage to slaves.”). 
 174. LA. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-FANATICAL SOC’Y, DIGEST OF THE LAWS 
RELATIVE TO SLAVES AND FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 
(1835), reprinted in STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE, supra note 
101, at 55. 
 175. An Act for Ordering and Governing Slaves Within this Province and for 
Establishing a Jurisdiction for the Trial of Offences Committed by Such Slaves, and Other 
Persons Therein Mentioned; and to Prevent the Inveigling and Carrying Away Slaves 
from Their Masters, Owners, or Employers §	23 (Ga. 1770), reprinted in LAWS OF 
GEORGIA, supra note 92, at 284; see also id. §§	21, 29, supra note 92, at 20, 23. 
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or other white person, paralleling the cases and statutes that regulated 
punishment of slaves.176 
Nonetheless, the cases discussed in this Section are compelling 
evidence that, shortly after the ratification of the Eighth Amendment, 
and well before ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment (a critical 
moment), the words “cruel and unusual punishment[]” had a 
generally accepted public meaning in the context of slavery. These 
words implied a limitation on excessive abuse and sometimes called 
for a consideration of “decency and the recognized proprieties of 
social life.”177 As discussed in the next Part, both of these aspects of 
slavery jurisprudence, even if they were rarely enforced in actuality, 
have significant implications for modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
III.  LESSONS FOR MODERN PRISONERS’ RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
The law of slavery revolved around the meaning of the same 
terms that govern the Eighth Amendment: “cruel” and “unusual” 
treatment. This Part will show that there is more than a surface 
similarity in these two areas of jurisprudence. Because the institution 
of slavery itself implied a delegation of state power to private 
slaveholders, the principles that governed the punishment of slaves 
were closely linked to the Eighth Amendment limitations on state 
punishment. Once that is acknowledged, the law of slavery provides 
at least two critical insights into the law of punishment. First, the law 
of slavery suggests that the Eighth Amendment’s language was meant 
to permit a proportionality inquiry into criminal punishments, thus 
providing an additional source of interpretation that bears on that 
extant debate. Second, the law of slavery exposes the impoverished 
state of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, in particular excessive 
force jurisprudence. 
A. Slavery as a Delegation of State Power 
The rhetorical links between slavery and prison are longstanding. 
Slaves correctly perceived slaveholders and others as arms of the 
 
 176. Jacob v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493, 519–20 (1842); see also Moses v. State, 30 
Tenn. (11 Hum.) 232, 241–42 (1850) (rejecting a self-defense claim based on prior 
whipping, because the owner had not whipped the slave “cruelly”); Nelson v. State, 29 
Tenn. (10 Hum.) 518, 535 (1850) (holding that a slave had the right to resist where a 
nonowner assaulted the slave “in a manner cruel and excessive”). The court in Nelson 
took care to note that the deceased was neither the slave’s master nor an overseer. Id. at 
527–28. 
 177. Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665–66 (1844). 
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state. As one former slave put it, “[t]he white man was the slave’s 
jail.”178 By the same token, prison and punishment were often 
associated with a form of slavery. When counsel for a defendant in 
1820s New York argued that a punishment violated the Eighth 
Amendment, he maintained that it imposed a penalty 
(disqualification from service in the legislature) “of the same 
undistinguished severity, upon all offences, without distinction as to 
their nature[,]” making the defendant a “slave in a nation of 
freemen.”179 None other than Blackstone compared a judge’s exercise 
of sentencing power on a whim to slavery, in which citizens “would 
live in society, without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations 
which it lays them under.”180 
The comparison had more than just rhetorical force in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however. Slaveholders were “the 
first rule-makers, the corrections officers, and even sometimes the 
executioners.”181 Prisoners and slaves both were condemned to “hard 
labour[,]”182 subjected to “moderate” correction,183 and physically 
restrained with shackles and chains.184 More importantly for the 
purposes of this Article, slaveholders exercised all of the powers over 
slaves that were otherwise reserved to the state. States analogized the 
power of slaveholders and overseers to inflict “reasonable 
punishment” to the power of the state to regulate.185 Slaveholders, 
 
 178. SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 8. 
 179. Barker v. People, 3 Cow. 686, 893 (N.Y. 1824), aff’g 20 Johns. 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1823) (affirming without addressing the Eighth Amendment issue because of its 
nonapplicablity to the states). 
 180. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *369–74. 
 181. SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 8. 
 182. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950) (noting that 
imprisonment with hard labor “would be no punishment or change of condition to slaves 
(me miserum!)”); An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing of Negroes and Other 
Slaves in This Province, No. 670, §	37 (S.C. 1740), reprinted in SOUTH CAROLINA 
STATUTES, supra note 86, at 411 (limiting the amount of time a slave could be put to “hard 
labor”); An Act for the Punishment of Vagabonds, and Other Idle and Disorderly 
Persons, and for Erecting Prisons, or Places of Security, in the Several Parishes of this 
Province; and for Preventing Trespasses on Lands of the Crown, or Lands Reserved for 
the Indians, and for the More Effectual Suppressing and Punishing Persons Bartering with 
the Indians in the Woods §	2 (Ga. 1764), reprinted in LAWS OF GEORGIA, supra note 92, at 
200 (creating a workhouse requiring “hard labour” of “vagabonds”). 
 183. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545, 554–55 (1857). 
 184. SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 8. 
 185. Gillian v. Senter, 9 Ala. 395, 397 (1846) (“The overseer of slaves, under a contract 
with the master, to supervise and direct their operations must be considered to some 
extent as standing in loco magisteri; and of necessity invested with the authority to inflict 
reasonable punishment for the breach of police regulations.”). In Tennessee, although 
slave owners might have been permitted to punish a slave for the slave’s criminal behavior 
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like wardens throughout time, “could withdraw ‘privileges’	” such as 
family visitation.186 The slaveholder’s powers over slaves were 
justified in quasi-sovereign terms, on the theory that the public 
welfare was better served by punishment “admeasured by a domestic 
tribunal.”187 
Slaveholders also had affirmative obligations akin to those of 
jailors or wardens. Even in the pre-Revolutionary era, it was well 
established in the slave states that slaveholders had affirmative duties 
to provide food, clothing, and shelter to their slaves.188 These 
standards were found in statutes and also as a matter of common 
law.189 Some states included provisions for the “care” of slaves in 
times of old age, sickness, or disability.190 These provisions continued 
into the nineteenth century.191 
 
without involving the state, a hirer could not. James v. Carper, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 397, 403 
(1857) (“The interests of the owner, sound policy, and humanity alike forbid that the hirer 
of a slave should be clothed with any such power; and if the hirer is possessed of no such 
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 186. SCHWARZ, supra note 80, at 10. 
 187. Gillian, 9 Ala. at 397. 
 188. SNETHEN, supra note 90, at 187 (quoting from Laws of Maryland, ch. 44, §	21 
(1715), requiring masters or overseers of “servants” to provide “sufficient meat, drink, 
lodging, and clothing”); An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and 
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Slaves in This Province, No. 670, §	38 (S.C. 1740), reprinted in SOUTH CAROLINA 
STATUTES, supra note 86, at 411; An Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves, No. 57, §	2 
(S.C. 1690), in SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTES, supra note 86, at 343 (requiring that all 
slaves “have convenient clothes, once every year”). 
 189. An Act Respecting Free Negroes, Mulattoes, Servants and Slaves §	10 (Ill. 1819), 
reprinted in THE PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTE LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 503 
(Stephen F. Gale ed., 1839) (requiring owners to provide “wholesome and sufficient food, 
clothing, and lodging, and at the end of their service,” to give them a new suit of clothes). 
Although North Carolina never adopted positive law protecting slaves from cruel 
punishment, in 1796 it enacted a statute that “denied compensation to the owners of slaves 
executed for crimes if the slaves had not been adequately fed, clothed, and treated with 
the ‘humanity consistent with his or her situation.’	” MORRIS, supra note 82, at 184. 
 190. LA. CONSTITUTIONAL AND ANTI-FANATICAL SOC’Y, DIGEST OF THE LAWS 
RELATIVE TO SLAVES AND FREE PEOPLE OF COLOUR IN THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 
(1835), reprinted in STATUTES ON SLAVERY: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE, supra note 
101, at 49 (reprinting the Black Code of 1806, which required that “[s]laves disabled 
through old age, sickness, or any other cause	.	.	.	shall be fed and maintained by their 
owners,” with a fine for failure to do so). 
 191. Ala. Laws tit. 5, ch. 4, §	2043 (1852), reprinted in THE CODE OF ALABAMA 390 
(John J. Ormond, Arthur P. Bagby & George Goldthwaite eds., 1852) (“The master must 
treat his slave with humanity and	.	.	.	must provide him with a sufficiency of healthy food 
and necessary clothing; cause him to be properly attended during sickness, and provide for 
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Indeed, one Virginia case from the early-nineteenth century 
reflects the intersection of the treatment of prisoners and slaves. In 
Dabney v. Taliaferro,192 the plaintiff had an escaped slave committed 
to King William County Jail in January 1821.193 After the slave 
became “diseased, frost-bitten from cold, crippled and maimed,” the 
plaintiff brought suit, claiming that the sheriff owed a duty to furnish 
necessary food, clothing, and shelter and that he had negligently 
failed in his duty, rendering the slave of “no value to the plaintiff.”194 
The jury entered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant 
appealed, arguing that he had no duty to provide protection from the 
cold to the escaped slave.195 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed 
and held that as a matter of common law, there was an obligation to 
provide food, clothing, and warmth to the prisoner-slave.196 It was 
irrelevant to the court that the prisoner was a slave, speaking to the 
extent to which the standards of treatment for prisoners and slaves 
were viewed in a similar light. Other jurisdictions came to similar 
conclusions.197 
Both individually and collectively, slaveholders and overseers 
functioned as the executive and the judiciary in enforcing law and 
dispensing punishments.198 Indeed, proslavery forces bragged of this 
system, arguing that in rural areas it saved these disputes from going 
 
his necessary wants in old age.”); An Act for the Protection of Slaves, Fla. Laws, ch. 256, 
§	1 (1849), reprinted in THE ACTS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 
THE STATE OF FLORIDA 69 (Joseph Clisby ed., 1849) (requiring owners to “feed, clothe, 
and provide” for slaves). 
 192. 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 256 (1826). 
 193. Id. at 256. 
 194. Id. at 256–57. 
 195. Id. at 261. 
 196. Id. (“Can we suppose a state of the weather at that season, which would justify the 
jailor in neglecting to make any sort of provision for the cold, neither a blanket to cover, 
nor a fire to warm the prisoner? If the particular day on which he was committed was so 
warm, as to have rendered such provision unnecessary for the moment, could the 
continuance of such weather be counted on, with so much certainty, as to justify the total 
omission of attention to the subject? I speak not now under the Act of Assembly, but on 
the principles of the common law; and I am clearly of opinion, that these principles do not 
warrant or excuse such omission and neglect. The genius of our law is not so cruel and 
unfeeling.”). 
 197. E.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 12 La. Ann. 190, 191 (1857) (rejecting a claim 
against the city for the death of a prisoner held in a New Orleans parish jail, but 
recognizing that a claim might exist for the negligence of individual jailors); McCarthy v. 
Lewis, 5 La. Ann. 115, 116 (1850) (acknowledging the possibility of imposing liability on a 
jailor for the death of a slave in a parish prison, if disease was caused by confinement in 
prison, but entering a judgment for the defendant on the facts). 
 198. FLANIGAN, supra note 122, at 74 (“For [minor offenses,] the planters might 
simply get together and agree on a punishment, usually a specified number of lashes 
administered by the master of the offending slave.”). 
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to court.199 State and municipal authorities also stepped into the shoes 
of slaveholders when necessary to prop up the institution of slavery. 
In urban areas, slaveholders relied on municipal authorities to punish 
slaves through local ordinances as well as to “correct” slaves through 
domestic discipline.200 In colonial Maryland, when a slaveholder 
believed that a slave “deserve[d] greater correction,” he was 
permitted to take the slave before a justice of the peace who could 
“order such correction as he shall think fit, not exceeding thirty-nine 
lashes for any one offence.”201 In this way the private punishment 
meted out by slaveholders was merged with the state. 
Moreover, the end of slavery and the beginning of 
Reconstruction prompted the rise of the penitentiary system, in which 
the conditions of slavery were recreated within prison walls.202 By 
1904, remarking on prison conditions during and after 
Reconstruction, a prison official would see the direct parallels 
between slavery and incarceration.203 Transitioning African-
Americans from slave labor to convict labor was a principal 
imperative during Reconstruction, accomplished through convicting 
as many black men as possible, with little regard for guilt or 
innocence.204 In 1919, even the Governor of Alabama would compare 
prison labor conditions to “a relic of barbarism[,]	.	.	.	a form of human 
slavery.”205 Prison and slavery were thus linked rhetorically, 
historically, and jurisprudentially. 
 
 199. Id. at 75. 
 200. Id. at 76–77 (“Every city allowed the master to send slaves to the workhouse or 
jail to have them corrected.”). 
 201. See SNETHEN, supra note 90, at 187 (quoting from Laws of Maryland, ch. 44, §	21 
(1715)). Along similar lines, a 1763 Georgia law permitted wardens of workhouses that 
held slaves to punish them by “moderate” whipping. An Act for Regulating a Work-house 
for the Custody and Punishment of Negroes §	3, 1763 Ga. Laws 7, reprinted in LAWS OF 
GEORGIA, supra note 92, at 163. 
 202. See generally BLACKMON, supra note 37, at 57 (describing how convict leasing 
practices during Reconstruction were almost identical to slavery practices in the 1850s); 
DAVID M. OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF 
JIM CROW JUSTICE (1997) (exploring the high level of incarceration rates of blacks during 
Reconstruction in Mississippi). 
 203. Gorman, supra note 15, at 449. 
 204. Id.; see also BLACKMON, supra note 37, at 53–54. 
 205. Gorman, supra note 15, at 451 (citing Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and 
Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646, 
651 (1982)). 
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B. Lessons from the Slave Cases for Modern Prisoners’ Rights 
Doctrine 
Given the formal intersection of slavery and state power, it is fair 
to think of the law of slave “punishment”206 as the law of state 
punishment for southern blacks. It is thus instructive to revisit the 
meaning given “cruel and unusual punishments” in the context of 
slavery. In that context, courts often looked to principles of 
proportionality as well as standards of decency—condemning 
“excessive” or “immoderate” punishments as well as “barbarous” 
ones.207 In addition, punishment that “flowed from a settled and 
malignant pleasure in inflicting pain, or a settled and malignant 
insensibility to human suffering” could result in criminal liability even 
for slaveholders.208 
These two aspects of the jurisprudence of slave punishment map 
well, if not perfectly, onto areas of prison jurisprudence. First, there 
continues to be a live debate within and without the Supreme Court 
about the extent to which principles of proportionality may be 
derived from the Eighth Amendment’s Punishments Clause.209 Much 
of that debate centers around what the drafters of the Eighth 
Amendment might have intended by their use of the phrase “cruel 
and unusual.”210 To the extent that scholarship has been brought to 
bear on this question, it has focused on the history and meaning of the 
documents that gave rise to the Punishments Clause, namely the 
English Bill of Rights and the Virginia Declaration of Rights.211 
The slavery jurisprudence examined here, however, presents 
another, perhaps more illuminating source of information. The 
slavery cases provide evidence that the terms used in the Punishments 
Clause had a well-understood and accepted public meaning grounded 
in proportionality principles, among other things.212 That is, it was 
well understood throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
that the terms “cruel” and “unusual” often implied a prohibition on 
excessive punishment.213 The jurisprudence of slavery, then, is 
 
 206. Slaves, of course, had committed no crime, and therefore what slaveholders called 
“punishment” is more accurately described as abuse and mistreatment. 
 207. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 208. State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 504–05 (1839); see also 
Copeland v. Parker, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 382, 383 (1843) (affirming the right to recover where 
shooting a slave “betrayed passion”). 
 209. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 211. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 212. See supra Part II. 
 213. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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consistent with the conclusions that legal historians have drawn from 
legal and moral commentary about the contemporaneous meaning of 
the Eighth Amendment during the time of the founding.214 The law of 
slavery offers additional reasons to believe that the original meaning 
of the Eighth Amendment aligns with the proportionality 
jurisprudence that a majority of the Supreme Court has come to 
embrace. 
There are caveats, of course, but they are not compelling. First, 
much of the slavery jurisprudence emerged after ratification of the 
Eighth Amendment. The legal community of the 1820s and 1830s may 
have been governed by significantly different interpretive principles 
as compared with the 1780s and 1790s, but there is no evidence to 
support this proposition. But even if this were the case, in some states, 
the equation of cruelty, at least, with excessiveness predated the 
Revolution.215 Second, the slavery jurisprudence revolved around 
statutory enactments and the common law, not constitutional 
interpretation.216 Of course, the relevant legislation and common law 
arose in some instances around the same time that the Eighth 
Amendment and parallel state constitutional provisions were 
adopted. More importantly, there is no evidence that the difference 
between constitutional and nonconstitutional sources was significant 
in the interpretation of these particular provisions, especially given 
the extent to which slaveholders were assumed to exercise quasi-
public power. 
In addition to being relevant to the ongoing debate about 
proportionality and constitutional limits on punishment, the slavery 
cases also expose the inadequacy of current Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence that is informed by “evolving standards of decency.” In 
the law of slavery, standards of protection were also theoretically 
governed by “decency and the recognized proprieties of social life,”217 
and “the moral sense and humanity of the present age.”218 This 
 
 214. See generally Bessler, supra note 15, at 315–27 (describing the use of concepts in 
case law, contemporaneous documents, and the writings of Blackstone and other 
“influential thinkers”); Pillsbury, supra note 17, at 896–98 (looking to writings of John 
Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Cesare Beccaria, and Montesquieu); Stinneford, supra note 12, 
at 1820–21 (“Once one recognizes that ‘unusual’ actually means ‘contrary to long usage,’ 
however, one realizes that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause almost certainly 
was intended to cover grossly disproportionate punishments.”); see also Schwartz & 
Wishingrad, supra note 17, at 806–13 (discussing the influence of Cesare Beccaria and 
other Enlightenment thinkers). 
 215. See supra Section II.A. 
 216. See supra Part II. 
 217. Turnipseed v. State, 6 Ala. 664, 665–66 (1844). 
 218. Werley v. State, 30 Tenn. (11 Hum.) 172, 175 (1850). 
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translated to the condemnation of treatment that was “indicative of 
wanton and brutal feelings[,]”219 “inhuman or brutal treatment,”220 
killing that was motivated by revenge or passion,221 or treatment that 
“flowed from a settled and malignant pleasure in inflicting pain, or a 
settled and malignant insensibility to human suffering.”222 Prisoners, 
in turn, are only protected from force used “maliciously and 
sadistically to cause harm.”223 Just as in the case of “immoderate 
correction” of slaves, prisoners must show that the force used was 
“wanton” and “unnecessary” in light of the need for the force.224 
Echoing the jurisprudence of slavery, prisoners are protected only 
from punishment that reflects “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”225 Prisoners, in other words, may yet be “slaves of the State.”226 
Thus, for those jurists and commentators who embrace an 
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment grounded in “evolving 
standards of decency,” it is fair to ask how far our jurisprudence has 
evolved from the time of slavery until now. It would surely be 
surprising to our current Supreme Court to be confronted with the 
observation that the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
appears to offer prisoners little more protection from abuse than was 
formally offered to nineteenth-century slaves. Even originalists would 
presumably be troubled by this observation.227 
 
 219. Gillian v. Senter, 9 Ala. 395, 397 (1846). 
 220. Oliver v. State, 39 Miss. 526, 539 (Miss. High Ct. Err. & App. 1860). 
 221. State v. Robbins, 48 N.C. (3 Jones) 253, 256 (1855) (affirming conviction for 
murder where a slaveholder killed a slave out of “cruelty, torture and revenge”); 
Copeland v. Parker, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 382, 383 (1843) (affirming a right to recover where 
shooting a slave “betrayed passion” in the overseer). 
 222. State v. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500, 504 (1839); see also Puryear v. 
Thompson, 24 Tenn. (5 Hum.) 397, 399–400 (1844) (distinguishing between a purpose of 
legitimate “correction” and the use of “instruments of torture to gratify [one’s] malice, 
intending to kill”). 
 223. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 
 224. Id. 
 225. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 226. See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). Andrea 
Armstrong has reported that newspaper accounts confirm that Ruffin was an African-
American prisoner. Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 869, 877–78 (2012). 
 227. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 807 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating that “slavery, and the 
measures designed to protect it, were irreconcilable with the principles of equality, 
government by consent, and inalienable rights proclaimed by the Declaration of 
Independence and embedded in our constitutional structure”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable 
and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of 
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These considerations call out for a transformation of our Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. First, we should now lay to rest originalist 
arguments that the Eighth Amendment cannot be squared with a 
proportionality principle. The best evidence of eighteenth-century 
understanding of the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishments” is 
that it connotes a proportionality requirement. One may quarrel with 
the metes and bounds of this principle—certainly slavery 
jurisprudence provides nothing to admire in terms of its application to 
particular facts. But the law of slavery is consistent with other 
historical evidence, all of it pointing towards an original public 
understanding of the words “cruel and unusual” that is inconsistent 
with the jurisprudence of avowedly originalist Justices. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, for the majority of 
Justices who believe the Eighth Amendment should be consistent 
with “evolving standards of decency,” the law of slavery should raise 
questions as to how much our prison jurisprudence has evolved and 
whether it truly incorporates evolving standards of decency. For 
example, the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted to protect 
prisoners against force used “maliciously and sadistically to cause 
harm,”228 because of the need to provide “wide-ranging deference” to 
prison administrators charged with maintaining order and 
discipline.229 The Court has adopted this high standard of proof in 
large part to acknowledge that corrections officers often have to 
make split-second decisions regarding whether the use of force is 
needed to keep order.230 
As a formal matter, this means that prisoners are protected from 
use of force inflicted for sadistic and malicious purposes, just as slaves 
once were in theory. In practice, courts are free to dismiss prisoners’ 
claims of being doused with urine and feces by correction officers,231 
punched in the genitals and shoved into cement by prison staff,232 
slapped several times for no reason,233 sprayed in the face with pepper 
 
thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred.”); Harmelin v. 
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 986 n.11 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (describing slavery as something 
“intensely undesirable”). 
 228. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. 
 229. Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321–22 (1986)). 
 230. Id. at 5–6 (contrasting the standard for excessive force with the standard for denial 
of medical care). 
 231. Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317, 341 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“This conduct, 
while certainly repulsive, is not sufficiently severe to be considered ‘repugnant to the 
conscience of mankind.’	”). 
 232. Murray v. Goord, 668 F. Supp. 2d 344, 357, 362 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 233. Perry v. Stephens, 659 F. Supp. 2d 577, 580, 582–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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spray or tear gas long after any disturbance has arisen,234 or forced to 
stand naked for eight to ten hours in a two-and-a-half-foot square 
cage.235 In other words, to ensure that prisoners are treated with basic 
standards of decency, it may be necessary to allow prisoners to move 
forward with legal claims without having to show that defendant 
officials were motivated by sadism or malice. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that viewing our Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence through the lens of the law of slavery offers two 
important insights. First, it shows that the current debate about 
whether the words “cruel and unusual punishments” were originally 
intended to encompass a review of sanctions for their excessiveness 
has overlooked a useful source of information. The positive and 
common law relating to the treatment of slaves suggest that the same 
words found in the Eighth Amendment were understood without 
controversy to regulate both the mode and amount of a given 
punishment. 
Second, the law of slavery suggests that standards of “decency,” 
to the extent they relate to the treatment of prisoners, cannot be said 
to have evolved significantly over time. Indeed, prisoners appear to 
receive legal protection from abusive use of force similar to that 
which slaves received in the nineteenth century. I am, however, wary 
of claiming too much—slaves were subjected to a system of injustice 
and brutality incomparable on every level to the modern-day 
treatment of prisoners. What this Article has sought to argue is that 
the dual legal frameworks for understanding and regulating the 
mistreatment of prisoners and slaves bear disturbing parallels. Even if 
the similarities are only skin deep, they justify further interrogation of 
the norms that have arisen in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
To close observers of the prison system, this conclusion may not 
come as a surprise. After all, there is substantial evidence that our 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has done little to protect prisoners 
from everyday abuse and mistreatment. In California, for instance, 
after decades of litigation, significant failures remain in the provision 
of mental-health treatment and medical care.236 And in New York 
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City, despite a vibrant and active prisoners’ rights bar, Rikers Island 
confronted accusations by the United States government of 
systematically abusing juvenile prisoners in violation of the 
Constitution.237 
What we might learn from the juxtaposition of the law of slavery 
with the law and reality of prisons today is that it is time for a new 
Eighth Amendment, one that offers more protection from abuse than 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century doctrine linked to the “peculiar 
institution”238 that has always been a stain on this country’s history. 
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Honorable Bill de Blasio, Mayor of N.Y.C., Joseph Ponte, Comm’r of the N.Y.C. Dep’t of 
Corr., and Zachary Carter, Corp. Counsel of N.Y.C., supra note 39 (detailing the results of 
an investigation into the treatment of juveniles held in detention at Rikers Island). New 
York City and the United States Department of Justice ultimately agreed to a settlement 
that addressed many issues, including concerns regarding the treatment of juveniles. See 
Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Attorney for the S. Dist. of N.Y., to The Honorable 
James C. Francis, IV, U.S. Dist. Judge for the S. Dist. of N.Y. (June 22, 2015), http://www
.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/479956/download [http://perma.cc/4EA2-AETC] 
(summarizing the settlement agreement). 
 238. Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 577 (1852). 
